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I.

INTRODUCTION

Regulation of the electric utility industry has been largely unquestioned in the seventy-five years since the first public service commissions were formed at the state level.' Technological improvements
combined with what were perceived to be inherent economies of scale
within the industry resulted in declining unit costs and stable electricity
rates.2 Under these conditions little conflict arose among customers,
regulators and the industry. Regulation became increasingly passive
and insulated electric utilities from competitive pressure. In fact, one
public utility commissioner characterized regulation in the 1960's as
non-existent, since planning and pricing decisions were largely made
3
by the industry.
In recent years, the electric utility industry has faced a number of
complex and interrelated problems. These include dramatic rises in the
cost of fuel and the cost of capital, a decline in the efficiency and reliability of electric power production and exhaustion of the economies of
scale associated with larger generating plants.' In response, state utility
commissions have increased the price of electricity while continuing to
approve inefficient and often discriminatory pricing schedules, and
have put a ceiling on allowed returns on equity5 that forces utilities to
raise needed capital by issuing stock at below average book value. In
addition, electric utility bond ratings have declined under a growing
perception that electric utilities are risky enterprises, thus raising the
cost of debt.6 If the industry cannot attract sufficient capital, power
shortages may occur by the late 1980's. 7 As a result, dissatisfaction
with the results of economic regulation has grown among diverse
. D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES 33-56 (1981).
2. Id at 68-69.
3. Id at 69-70. In 1965 two formal rate of return reviews were processed by state regulatory
commissions. In 1975 114 such reviews were processed. Id Paul Joskow has characterized regulation by state commissions as "regulation by benign neglect." Joskow, Electric Utility Rate Structure in the UnitedStates: Some Recent Developments, in PUBLIC UTILITY RATE MAKING IN AN
ENERGY-CONscIOUS ENVIRONMENT 2 (W. Sichel ed. 1979).
4. H.R. REP. No. 496 (Pt. IV), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprintedin 1978 U,S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 8454, 8572; A. CANON & P. MACAVOY, THE DECLINE OF SERVICE IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES 39-40 (1981).
5. Cf. Corrigan, UtilitiesPaying Pricefor Countingon Demand Growth That Never Came, 13
NAT'L J. 1848 (1981). From 1975-1980, the rate of return on average common equity held steady
at 11.7%.
6. Id From 1975-1980, the average yield on bonds grew from 9% to 13%. This rise may in
part be attributable to inflation.
7. A. CANON & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 4, at 67-68. See also Berry, The Case/orCompetition in the Electric Utility Industry, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 13, 1982, at 13; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC POWER IN AMERICA:
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groups. Moreover, recent empirical studies have questioned the reason
for regulating some services of the electric utility industry in the absence of natural monopoly characteristics.' Other studies have outlined such potential benefits to be derived from an interplay of
competition and coordination among electric utility firms as efficiency,
innovation and exploitation of economies of scale. 9
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. Section
II briefly describes the process and objectives of rate regulation and
examines the effectiveness of regulation in controlling monopoly profits
and devising an equitable and efficient rate structure. Section III examines the natural monopoly rationale for regulating the electric utility
industry in light of recent empirical studies. Section IV suggests that
both coordination and competition among electric utilities are needed.
The structure of the industry and possible competitive markets for electricity are described and the extent to which competition and coordination can coexist within the industry is investigated. Various hindrances
to competition and coordination, as well as the federal response to such
hindrances, are considered. Section V examines recent proposals to
restructure and deregulate certain services of the electric utility industry in order to create a more efficient and competitive industry, and
presents a less radical and disruptive proposal for competition among
electric utilities within a regulatory context. Section V also explores
some likely effects of increased competition within the electric utility
industry.
In brief, this article finds that the present regulatory scheme harms
the electric utility industry and its customers, and that the traditional
justification for regulation may no longer be valid. The electric utility
industry can attain greater efficiency and reliability through competition among utilities than through government regulation.
II.
A.

RATE REGULATION

The Regulatory Process

Utility commissions determine the revenue needs of an electric
utility in a rate hearing. Typically, a test year is selected from the recent past and the utility is asked to submit its expenses from that year.
GROWTH ES-9 (DOE/PE-0045 1983). But see Foley, Electric Utility Financing-Let'sEase off the
PanicButton, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 6, 1983, at 21.
8. See infra notes 81-119 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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The regulatory commission reviews the expenses and may disallow any
items it deems improper. The revenue allowance also includes a fair
return to stockholders and bondholders who have provided the capital
necessary for financing the utility.'0 The utility then files a rate schedule for the various classes of customers designed to enable it to cover its
cost of service and allowed return. A year may elapse between hearings due to the complicated nature of the proceedings. This is commonly referred to as regulatory lag."
Until recently, utilities have been allowed broad discretion to
adopt a rate structure that maximizes profits. Most commissions, however, do have the authority to disallow specific rates if they are unjust,
unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory.' 2 If a competitor or customer
of an electric utility complains that a specific rate is either too low or
too high, a commission can hold hearings and order the utility to revise
its rate structure. Most commissions also have authority to impose rate
structures upon utilities.' 3
In addition, commissions can regulate which territories a utility
can serve by prohibiting the initiation, extension or abandonment of
service without a certificate of public convenience and necessity. A
new utility desiring to enter a market is also subject to this requirement.
The electric utility industry is subject to control by both federal
and state agencies. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) has jurisdiction over the interstate transmission and sale of
electric energy by privately owned utilities.' 4 Regulation by state and
10. The fair return is computed by multiplying the utility's rate base by the fair rate of return.
The fair rate of return is a composite percentage made up of the interest the utility must pay
bondholders and the estimated cost of attracting the necessary equity capital. The rate base is
either the depreciated original or the replacement cost of the assets used in providing the service or
it is some figure in between called the fair value. Though rate base valuation is the subject of a
great deal of litigation, one study concluded, after allowing for jurisdictional variation, that
whether original cost, fair value, or replacement cost was selected as the method for calculating
the rate base, there was no substantial difference in the earnings of regulated firms. Primeaux,
Rate Base Methods and Realized Rates of Return, 16 ECON. INQUIRY 95, 104-05 (1978). But see
Petersen, The Effect of "Fair Value" Rate Base Valuation in Electric Utiliy Regulation, 31 J. FIN.
1487, 1490 (1976) ("[flirms operating in fair value jurisdictions, on average, are allowed and earn
higher profit rates than those firms regulated by commissions who adhere to the original cost
concept.")
11. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATE REGULATION OF ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES 39
(DOE/EIA-0201/4) (1980).
12. 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 40-45 (1970).
13. Lifeline rates are an example of a rate structure imposed by commissions. See infra notes
70-71 and accompanying text.
14. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (1982). The interstate wholesale power market over which FERC
has jurisdiction comprises about 10% of the total power sales. Corrigan, supra note 5, at 1850.
FERC also regulates the rates of federally produced electrical power. This market comprises
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local bodies varies, though almost all states exercise control over retail

rates, thus controlling the profitability of privately owned utilities.' 5
B. Objectives of Regulation
The traditional reason for regulating electric utilities is that they
are natural monopolies. 6 A natural monopoly exists where unit costs
tend to decline as output is concentrated in a single supplier.' 7 Under
such circumstances a monopoly is inevitable because it is the cheapest
way to organize the industry, since one firm can supply the entire re-

quired output at a lower cost than could two or more firms. If the
electric utility industry is a declining cost industry, it would be reason-

able both to grant one utility an exclusive franchise to insure the most
efficient allocation of resources and to place the utility under rate regu-

lation to prevent exploitation by the monopoly.

The exclusive

franchise would permit economies of scale which could not be realized

by several smaller firms. In addition, since the unregulated monopolist
will attempt to maximize profits by producing at the level where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, the firm will reap excessive profits

while some consumer demand at the level of long run average costs will
not be satisfied.'" This results in a misallocation of resources to other
industries and a loss of consumer surplus to society.' 9 To eliminate
about 3.5% of all power sales. Pace & Landon, Introducing Competition into the Electric Utility
Industry: An Economic Appraisal, 3 ENERGY L.J. 10, 12 (1982). FERC became a regulatory
agency on October 1, 1977, when the Commission functions of the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) were transferred to FERC pursuant to § 402 of the Department of Energy Organization
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a) (1982). In this article "FERC" will be used in reference to periods after
October 1, 1977, and "FPC" will be used in reference to periods prior to October 1, 1977.
15. See Meeks, Concentration in the ElectricPower Industry: The Impact OfAntitrust Policy,
72 COLUM. L. REv. 64, 66 n.8 (1972) for a detailed list of jurisdictional authorities. Sixteen state
commissions have been authorized to control the rates of local publicly owned systems. Pace &
Landon, supra note 14, at 11.
16. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 117-19.
17. Id at 119; see also P. LEBEL, ENERGY ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY 354 (1982) (natural monopoly exists where declining average costs are found over the dominant, if not exclusive,
range of production).
18. Marginal revenue is the additional revenue obtained by a firm when it sells one more unit
of output. Marginal cost is the additional cost of producing one more unit of output. W. NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 605 (1979). Average costs are the
total costs incurred by a firm divided by the total output produced. Id at 183. Long run refers to
the period of time in which all inputs can be varied by the producer and is conceptually distinct
from the short run, which refers to the shorter period of time in which some inputs are regarded as
being fixed. Id at 606.
19. Consumer surplus is the difference between what an individual actually pays and what
the individual would be willing to pay for the service. Most firms treat all buyers as a group and
will in any period sell their output at a single price to this group. Most firms are unable to charge
the maximum amount each individual will pay for their output. It is the marginal buyer who
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these distortions the electric utility is required to make service available
to everyone in its service area to the extent demanded by the consumers
at a "fair and reasonable" price.
The first objective of regulation is to control monopoly profits and
thereby encourage efficiency and large scale production, deterring entry
into the industry. Utility commissions also directly control entry by
granting franchises. Entry restrictions justify government control of
the price structure a firm adopts to meet its revenue requirements. In
the absence of entry restrictions, a firm faced with a new entrant will
lower rates in the competitive portion of its market while raising rates
in the monopolistic portion of its market in order to recoup its revenue
needs. In the absence of new market entrants, there is less reason for
the utility to discriminate among customers. Rather, entry restrictions
allow regulators a voice in determining which customers to favor.20
This leads to the second objective of regulation-an efficient and
equitable price structure that prevents excessive price discrimination
across and within customer classes. In a declining cost industry, the
marginal cost of producing a unit of output is below average cost.
Marginal cost is generally considered to be the place at which prices are
to be set in order to give correct signals to society and thereby encourage an efficient allocation of resources.2 ' If utility rates were set at
marginal cost, however, the firm's total revenue would be less than its
total cost. If rates were set at average cost, the marginal purchaser,
confronted with a false alternative, might switch to a less efficient
(higher marginal cost) substitute. The gap between marginal cost and
determines the price. Other buyers who would have been willing to pay more receive a "bonus"
called consumer surplus. A monopolist is able to reduce output and raise the price, transferring
some portion of consumer surplus into monopoly profits. In addition, a monopoly price creates a
net loss to society (as contrasted with a transfer of resources from consumers to monopolist) called
a deadweight loss. Id at 318. See also P. LEBEL, supra note 17, at 409.
20. A recent empirical study comparing the rate structures of regulated and unregulated municipal utilities in 1972 found much greater price discrimination in state regulated municipal utilities than in unregulated municipal utilities. As between industrial, commercial and residential
users of electricity, state regulators favored industrial customers the most, followed by commercial
customers. Residential customers suffered. Hollas & Friedland,Price Discriminationin the Municipal Electric Industry, in 2 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 181, 192-94 (R. Zerbe ed. 1980).
See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
21. Incremental cost is often used as a rough approximation of marginal cost, since the capital cost of new capacity is averaged over all its users rather than being charged completely to the
marginal user. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 75-77. New capacity becomes necessary when
the utility is operating at peak capacity and there is an unmet demand for service. Because of
averaging, incremental pricing may not necessarily generate sufficient revenues to cover all capital
costs if customer demand is less than all the new capacity. Newburger, Reforming Electric Utility
Rate Regulation Reform: Peak-LoadPricesWithout Long-Run IncrementalCost Anaoysis, 28 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 556, 573-74 (1978).
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average cost for a declining cost firm is roughly equal to the firm's fixed
costs, 22 and so any price set equal to or above marginal cost contributes
to the fixed costs of providing the service. Utilities are allowed to apportion to different classes of customers different fixed or capacity costs
of service based on the customers' willingness to pay. Regulation assures that utility customers pay only their fair share of fixed costs.
The third objective of regulation is to assure an adequate level of
service on a continuing basis to all classes of users.23 In the absence of
regulation some demand might not be served and regional planning
might not be sufficient to assure adequate service. The paternalistic
thinking behind this objective is clear.24
C. Effectiveness of Regulation
1. Price Level
How effective is the regulatory scheme in meeting the objectives
discussed above? Professors Stigler and Friedland found that between
1912 and 1937 regulation was largely ineffective in influencing electric
rates, rate discrimination, and returns to investors. 2 A comparison was
made between those states which regulated electric utilities and those
which did not. Average rate levels were the same in regulated and unregulated states. The ratio of monthly residential bills for large
amounts of electricity relative to small amounts of electricity was also
the same, whereas it had been assumed that regulatory commissions
would grant lower rates to small residential consumers. In addition,
the ratio of domestic rates to industrial rates was the same in regulated
and unregulated states, although it had been assumed that commissions
would reduce residential rates relative to industrial rates in order to
reduce discrimination. Returns to investors were also the same between regulated and unregulated states.
Stigler and Friedland concluded that a regulatory commission is
22. Fixed costs, such as capital or capacity costs, are costs that do not change as the level of
output changes in the short run. W. NICHOLSON, supra note 18, at 604. Technically the gap
between marginal cost and average cost is only equal to fixed costs in the short run when marginal
cost equals average variable cost. Variable costs are those costs such as fuel costs that change in
response to changes in the level of output being produced by a firm. Id at 606.
23. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, DEREGULATION OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES: A SURVEY OF
MAJOR CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 5 (1981).
24. An argument can be made that external planning of electric utilities is no more needed
than provisions for grocery stores or other necessities.
25. Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case ofElectricity, 5 J. LAW &
ECON. 1 (1962).
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incapable of forcing a utility to operate at a specified combination of
output, price and cost. If rates (prices) are set at average cost at some
output beyond the profit maximizing one, then the utility could reduce
costs, thus increasing profits, by reducing the quality of its service (output) in such areas as "peak load capacity, constancy of current,
promptness of repairs [or] speed of installation of service." 26 As an
alternative, monopoly profits could be concealed through highly sophisticated accounting procedures requiring great expertise to detect,
and calling for close judgement calls by regulators. Decisions about
which assets to include in the rate base, the valuation of those assets,
depreciation allowances or the separation of costs between different
regulatory jurisdictions (some of which may be less vigilant) are business judgements liable to be resolved in favor of the utility. Furthermore, the determination of a fair rate of return on the rate base
depends on comparisons with other firms and industries. Such comparisons are circular when other regulated firms serve as a benchmark
and misleading when nonmonopolists engaged in dissimilar businesses
serve as a benchmark.
In another study, Professor Moore has shown that regulation has
not reduced private utility residential electricity prices by more than
five percent from their profit maximizing position. 7 In that study the
marginal costs of sixty-two private electric companies were computed
for the years 1952-1962, and the demand curves facing them were estimated. Marginal revenues were assumed to be equal to marginal costs
in arriving at the profit maximizing prices which were then compared
to the actual rates charged. Moore concluded that to the extent a utility
faced competition from surrounding utilities "any removal of regulation would increase the elasticity of demand above the elasticity for the
market and so lead to lower prices."28
26. Id at 11. Load is the amount of electric power required at any specified point or points
on a system. The simultaneous needs for electric power of the system's customers determine the
load which the system must meet.
27. Moore, The Effectiveness ofRegulation ofElectric Utility Prices, 36 S. ECON. J. 365 (1970).
Another study examining profit maximization at the wholesale level concluded that regulated
investor-owned utilities buy wholesale electricity at lower rates and sell wholesale power at higher
rates than do unregulated government-owned utilities. DeAlessi, Some Effects of Ownershi on the
Wholesale PricesofElectric Power, 13 J. ECON. INQUIRY 526 (1975). But see Meyer & Leland, The
Effectiveness of Price Regulation, 62 REv. ECON. & STAT. 555 (1980) (results display wide variation of effectiveness of regulation but on average prices charged by regulated electric utilities

lower than those which maximize profit, though not optimal in the sense of profits plus consumer
welfare).
28. Moore, supra note 27, at 374. The price elasticity of demand is a measure of the sensitiv-
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Even effective regulatory control of profits, however, has an adverse impact on a utility's incentives to operate efficiently. At least
theoretically, if a firm's costs increase it can either pass them on to its
customers as part of its expenses or it can make up the rise in costs by a
suitable increase in rates for its inelastic demand services.2 9 (This assumes the demand for some services of an electric utility is inelastic
over the relevant output range.)3" Under such circumstances there is
little motivation to keep expenditures down. The major check on this
incentive problem is the occurrence of regulatory lag3 t-the delay between the time when a tariff is filed and the time when it is actually
permitted-in an inflationary environment. In that situation, electric
utilities, faced with rising costs which greatly erode earnings, are forced
to be cost efficient during the lag period. Regulatory lag, however, has
been reduced significantly by automatic adjustment clauses that pass
through costs to consumers without any regulatory hearing.3 2 On the
other hand, a regulatory commission operates in a political environment, and it may be assumed that in the event technological innovation
actually lowers costs, regulatory lag would be shortened to allow a
quicker rate reduction. Shortening regulatory lag, however, could
thwart the utility's incentive to innovate, since the motivation for a firm
to innovate is the unusual but temporary profits that innovation
permits.
Professors Averch and Johnson also contend that rate base regulation causes inefficiency. 33 They assert that when the allowed rate of
return is greater than the cost of capital, utility firms have an incentive
to use more capital than would otherwise be efficient. 34 There are a
number of ways this tendency to use more capital may affect the elecity of an amount of a good demanded to a change in its price and is defined as the percent change
in quantity demanded divided by the percent change in its price. P. LEBEL, supra note 17, at 526.
29. Baumol, Reasonable Rulesfor Rate Regulation: PlausiblePoliciesforan Imperfect World,
in THE CRISIS OF REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 187, 190 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970).
30. Spann, FederalRegulation of Electric Utilities Via Taxation and Litigation, in REGULATORY REFORM 2 (V. Moore ed. 1976) cites evidence of inelastic demand in some markets for
electricity.
31. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 48.
32. See in/ra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
33. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON.
REV. 1052 (1962).
34. J. QUIRK, INTERMEDIATE ECONoMics 262 (1976). The recent rise in the cost of capital
may negate this effect temporarily. There is also disagreement among commentators over the
validity of the Averch and Johnson hypothesis. See, e.g., S. BREYER & P. MACAvOY, ENERGY
REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 108 (1974); Boyes,An EmpiricalExamination
of the Averch-Johnson Effect, 14 EcoN. INQUIRY 25 (1976). See also U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY,
supra note 7, at ES-16 to ES-18.
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tric utility industry.35 First, electric utilities maintain a large amount of
capacity in excess of peak requirements and additional capacity adds to
a company's rate base. For example, in 1963 electric companies had
twenty-five percent more generating capacity than the expected annual
peak load. Coordination among companies could have reduced the
need for excess capacity, possibly saving as much as two billion dollars.3 6 As a result of this bias towards excess capacity, electric firms
resist both peak load pricing-which would tend to hold down the expansion of demand for scarce energy resources consumed in electrical
production-and coordination or pooling arrangements with neighboring utilities-which would reduce the cost of reserve load capacity.
Second, the tendency to use more capital explains the reluctance on the
part of electric utilities to lease facilities from others. According to a
1968 WallStreet Journalarticle, 37 electric utilities have been hesitant to
lease fuel cores despite "unquestioned advantages." Third, the willingness of utilities to use excess capital may explain their tendency to adhere to excessively high standards of reliability and uninterruptibility
of service. While this tendency is hard to demonstrate, it is reasonable
to assume that lower overall cost levels could be achieved since utilities
sell services of various degrees of interruptibility. Fourth, this willingness may also explain a tendency for utilities to bargain less aggressively than they otherwise would for input factors. An example of this
tendency was the eagerness of electric utility companies to pay extremely high prices for electric equipment during the electric equipment manufacturers' price conspiracy of the late 1950's. It is significant
that the conspiracy was brought to light by the complaints not of a
private utility but rather by the Tennessee Valley Authority.38 A possible fifth effect of the tendency to use inefficient amounts of capital is
the willingness of electric utilities to diversify into regulated or unregulated markets. By purchasing input manufacturers and then raising
35. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 50-54.
36. Wein, FairRate of Return and Incentives, in PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 49 (H.
Trebing ed. 1968). See also Iowa Public Service Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 339, 369 (Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n 1982) (reserve margin of as much as 25% held justified without penalty
to investors). A Department of Energy study states that reserve margins in the 1980's have been
30-35%. The study asserts, however, that when existing supply is adjusted to eliminate economically obsolete generation, reserves are about 20%. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at ES-8.
The study admits that the current excess reserve capacity is not likely to disappear until the end of
the decade. Id at ES-26.
37. Utilities' Embraceof NuclearFuel Stalled by its Classificationas a CurrentAsset, Wall St.
J., Nov. 12, 1968, at 4.
38. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 53-54.
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prices to itself the utility transfers monopoly profits to the unregulated
portion of its industry. One example has been the investment by many

electric companies in coal mines. In 1967, coal mines owned by utiliof shipments to electric utilities.
ties accounted for 4.4% of the total cost
39

By 1974, this had increased to

6.3%.

Professor Courville conducted an empirical study to test the validity of the overcapitalization hypothesis in the electric utility industry. n
His results confirmed the hypothesis and led to a conclusion that in
1962, 436.5 million dollars or twelve percent of total production costs

could have been saved by more efficient production of electricity.
The financial pressure placed on electric utilities in recent years by

rising fuel and construction costs combined with regulatory lag led regulators to respond by changing the regulatory process. Automatic adjustment clauses appeared. 4 1 Forty-seven commissions have authority

to establish automatic adjustment clauses and thirty commissions have
allowed them. 42 The hope was that resulting higher costs to consumers

would depress demand, accurately reflect real cost increases so as to
better allocate resources, and promote fuel conservation.4 3 The actual
effect has been to depress demand and create excess capacity, diminish
incentives to bargain aggressively for fuel purchases, and to create 44a

bias in favor of inputs which are includable in adjustment clauses.
One utility paid five million dollars more for coal in 1977 than it would

39. This reflection of the Averch-Johnson effect was noted in U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
To the
extent that any regulated firm has an incentive to diversify and turn regulated firm costs into
profits in its unregulated division, this may not reflect the Averch-Johnson effect.
40. Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 53, 74 (1974). For other confirmations of this effect see Petersen, An Empirical Test of
Regulatory Effects, 6 BELL J. ECON. 111 (1975); Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in
Production: An Empirical Test ofthe Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC1. 38
(1974); Atkinson & Halvorsen, A Test ofRelative and Absolute Price Efficiency in Regulated Utilities. 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 81 (1980).
41. Automatic adjustment clauses permit the flow through of selected cost increases without
the need for a regulatory proceeding.
42. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 39, at 41.
43. Trebing, Market StructureandRegulatoryReform in the Electric and Gas Utility Industries
in SALVAGING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 81 (W. Sichel ed. 1976). A 1977-1978 study found
that utilities with automatic adjustment clauses pay a higher average price for their fuel inputs
than those utilities that did not allow the passing on of fuel price increases. The difference between the prices paid, aggregated over 1977 and 1978, was estimated to be 4.9 billion dollars.
However, this amount was partially offset by the benefits accruing from automatic adjustment
clauses in resource savings from conserving on rate hearings and in preservation of the utilities'
ability to attract capital investment. Kaserman & Tepel, The Impact ofthe Automatic Adjustment
Clause on FuelPurchaseand Utilization Practicesin the U.S. Electric Utility Industry, 48 S. ECON.
J. 687, 688, 696 (1982).
44. Kaserman & Tepel, supra note 43, at 687.
STATE REGULATION OF ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES 36 (DOE/EIA-0201/4) (1980).
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have paid at the going market price." As of 1977, only five states con46
ducted audits to verify costs and procurement practices.
Most of the current excess capacity developed after the 1973 oil
embargo when automatic adjustment clauses shifted rates up and demand down. Demand had been increasing at a fast rate and utilities,
assuming demand would continue to grow at the same rate, invested in
more generating plants. In the face of inflation and a high debt cost,
utilities are now making a concerted effort to get costs for construction
work in progress (CWIP) included in their rate bases to ease the financing of projects begun ten years ago.47 From 1967 to 1979 cash earnings
increased sixty percent in twelve years but construction costs quadrupled. Commissions have directed utilities to capitalize interest expenses on debt incurred for CWIP in a non-cash asset account
reflecting capital charges (called Allowance for Funds Used During
Construction) to be included in the rate base only after generating
plants enter service. This requirement has resulted in cash flow
problems for utilities. Utilities as a whole in 1979 had cash earnings of
3.8 billion dollars but paid out 5.6 billion dollars in dividends.4 8
Commissions have also found it necessary to discourage new plant
investments. Between 1970 and 1980, commissions denied 11.8 billion
dollars or thirty-seven percent of total requests for rate increases (nine
billion dollars have been denied since 1976). Two reasons given for
these rate relief denials were the failure of utilities to deal with excess
reserve capacity and the willingness of electric utility management to
sell stock at below book value to finance new plants in the face of such
capacity.4 9 At issue, then, is whether utilities may charge their customers for power plants that are not yet and may never be in service.5 0
2.

Price Structure

Another major problem area in regulation is the determination of
an efficient and equitable price structure. Commissions find this area
45. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 39, at 42.

46. Id at 43.
47. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 221 (Il. Commerce
Comm'n 1982) (utility allowed 50% of CWIP in rate base); Houston Lighting and Power Co., 50
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 157 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982) (utility allowed 100% of CWIP in
rate base).
48. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, IMPACTS OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE ELECTRIC UTILITY

INDUSTRY A12, A15 (DOE/EIA-0311) (1981).
49. Id at A6, A10-12.
50. Corrigan, supra note 5, at 1850.
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confusing and often act arbitrarily. Electric utilities have large fixed
and joint costs that must be distributed among customers in order for
utilities to earn their allowed revenue." While marginal cost pricing is
generally believed to maximize efficient resource allocation and protect
consumer welfare by sending the right signals to consumers and by
supplying additional output to marginal consumers, if a utility priced
all of its output at marginal cost, it would not recover for its full costs.
Economic theory requires that assumptions be made about interpersonal utility comparisons in distributing fixed costs. Professor Kahn
asserts that "if we assume equal marginal utilities of income, efficiency
requires that fixed costs be borne by the users with the least elastic
demand."52 In his view some price discrimination is justifiable as long
as rates do not fall below long run marginal costs. This is an example
of a demand-based rate structure, since price is based on customer
demand.
Professor Baumol advocates that all utility prices be proportional
to marginal costs. 53 This would eliminate discrimination and the consumer would receive the correct price (cost) signals; it would not, however, lead to an efficient allocation of resources (as, for example, where
electricity serves both as a consumer's good and as an input to another
process).54 Baumol concedes that the prices of some elastic demand
services would have to be lowered slightly for the firm to acquire the
allowed revenue. In addition, marginal cost would be very difficult to
calculate since there is an inherent circularity: the choice of rates affects the quantities purchased which, in turn, affect marginal cost.
Baumol's proposal is an example of a cost-based rate structure since the
firm's costs serve as a benchmark for price.
Historically, rate structures have been demand-based. 55 Electric
51. This discussion assumes, as has been true historically, that average costs exceed marginal
costs. Recent evidence, however, suggests that this is no longer the case. See infra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text.
52. Kahn, Inducements to Superior Performance-Price,in PERFORIANCE UNDER REGULATION 97 (H. Trebing ed. 1968).
53. Baumol, supra note 29, at 202.
54. Id at 202 n.12.
55. There are generally three cost classifications within any demand-based rate structure:
customer-related, energy-related and demand-related. Customer-related costs vary with the
number of customers served. These small fixed user fees composed of the costs of distribution
include metering, billing, and accounting. Energy-related costs, primarily fuel costs, vary with the
amount of electricity produced and decline as consumption increases. Demand-related costs are
the fixed costs of doing business, such as the costs associated with plant and equipment. Demandrelated costs pose the greatest problem in allocation because they are joint in nature and cannot be
attributed to any one class of customers. Newburger, supra note 21, at 563-64; see also Hunting-
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utilities have employed declining block tariffs. Under this rate structure, customers pay a fixed user charge and a per-kilowatt hour charge
that falls in blocks as consumption increases, 56 encouraging consumption. Greater consumption in turn encouraged the addition of new
plant facilities during the growth period of the 1960's, since increased
capacity is built to meet a maximum rate of demand during peak
hours. In recent years, rising fuel costs have been passed on to consum57
ers, decreasing demand for electricity and creating excess capacity.
The decrease in demand may also have reduced power plant efficiency
and reliability. Intuition and some evidence suggest that the elasticity
of demand for electricity is somewhat higher during off-peak periods
than during peak periods, since if prices rise uniformly in all time periods, consumers will cut consumption back most during the off-peak
period." The result is that power plants will be utilized less during offpeak periods while continuing to be threatened with overloads in peak
periods. Moreover, a rate structure encouraging consumption consumes scarce energy resources and encourages utilities to build excessive capacity at a time when the economies associated with large power
plants have been exhausted. 9
An additional problem with declining block rates is that the average price will vary for customers depending on quantity purchased,
creating price discrimination. Utilities argue that large industrial customers should be charged less because they take power at higher voltages with smaller connection costs and on a more predictable basis.6"
Discrimination does not always clash with cost-based pricing, but there
is recent evidence confirming the existence of inefficient and unjust discrimination. Professors Primeaux and Nelson found that industrial
users did pay lower rates than residential users.6 ' But given the higher
elasticity of demand of industrial users, such discrimination may be
justifiable. If the inelastic demand residential rate payer did not subsidize the elastic demand industrial rate payer who purchases at marginal cost, idle capacity would be greater because the industrial customer
ton, The Rapid Emergence of MarginalCost Pricing in the Regulation ofElectric Utiliti Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L. REV. 689, 709-10 (1975); Comment, Reform of Electricit' Pricing in the United
States, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 183, 183 (1975).
56. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 39, at 50.
57. See supra, notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
58. Spann, supra note 30, at 3.
59. H.R. REP. No. 496, supra note 4, at 8572.
60. W. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 328 (1979).

61. Primeaux & Nelson, An ExaminationofPrice Discriminationand InternalSubsidizationb
Electric Utilities, 47 S. ECON. J. 84, 96-98 (1980).
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would not be induced to take the service, and the average unit cost for
the residential customer would be even higher. More importantly,
however, the study found discrimination between large and small volume users within the same customer class. Rates were priced below
long run marginal cost in the last user block of each consumer.
Primeaux and Nelson concluded that marginal prices should be raised
run marginal cost in order to encourage more
in each block to long
62
efficient utilization.
Until recently commissions left the determination of rate structures to utilities.6 3 But along with the scarcity of fuel, increased power
failures and consumer resistance to higher prices has come an increased
public interest in rate formation. The Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) was enacted by Congress in response to
these problems. 64 Title I of PURPA requires each state regulatory authority and nonregulated municipal utility to consider within two years
certain federally recommended standards and to determine within
three years whether or not to implement those standards. The standards include rate structures reflecting the actual costs of service, peakload pricing such as time of day and seasonal rates, prohibition of declining block rates that do not reflect costs, and restrictions on the use
of automatic adjustment clauses. The state commissions are free to implement the standards or reject them. Title I has as its goal the implementation of a peak-load pricing policy. Even without the prodding of
were already considering adopting
the federal government, a few states
65
some form of peak-load pricing.
The usual rationale for peak-load pricing is relatively simple.
Generating plants are built to meet peak demands. Those who use
power during peak periods should pay a higher price reflecting the additional capacity needed to meet their demand. The off-peak users
should pay only the marginal cost attributable to their use, since they
were not responsible for the additional capacity. This makes peak-load
pricing a cost-based concept. 66 To the extent that electric utilities have
many plants with different variable costs, some of which are used only
at peak times, this reasoning is correct. Power plants with higher varia62.
63.
64.
fied at

Id
See D. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 65.
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codi16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-45 (1982)).

65. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 95TH CONG., lST SESS., THE ELECTRIC UTILITY
SECTOR: CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND PROBLEMS 30-31 (1977).

66. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 95-103.
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ble costs would be used only at peak times or would be used more
intensely at peak times. Under such circumstances, true marginal costs
would be attributable to peak-load service. In practice, however, once
a power plant is in place and the same capacity serves all customers,
the capacity costs of such a facility cannot really be attributed to either
peak or non-peak users. Professor Morgan has argued that peak pricing would be better viewed as demand-based pricing.67 Only by aggregating the demand functions of both peak and non-peak users can the
optimal plant size be obtained. If no fixed costs are placed on the nonpeak user, his demand may exceed capacity. If the non-peak user pays
a part of the capacity charge while the peak user continues to pay the
full charge, however, the utility reaps a windfall.
This is not to say that peak users should not pay a higher rate than
non-peak users. While peak-load pricing is not necessarily synonomous with marginal cost pricing,68 a price differential between peak
and non-peak consumers is efficient. It encourages an optimal use of
scarce energy resources and leads to an overall lower average price for
electricity. If peak capacity is priced higher than non-peak capacity,
capacity requirements would be lower, which would lead to a lower
69
overall average cost to the utility.
Title I of PURPA, as a concession to low income residential consumers, also endorses lifeline rates.70 Lifeline rates represent a departure from optimum allocative cost-based pricing and may contradict
one of the purposes of peak pricing: to level demand. A lifeline rate is
a charge, normally below marginal cost, placed on a low consumption
of electricity. It involves cross-subsidization between classes of custom7
ers and has all the defects of an in-kind subsidy. '
The above discussion assumes that average costs exceed marginal
67. T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 397-99 (1976).

68. Peak-loading pricing of electricity means selling electricity under a rate structure
that reflects thepattern of variation in marginal costs ...
Marginal-cost pricing in its purest form would set the price of each unit of electricity
at exactly the incremental cost of its supply at every moment; electricity prices would
therefore reflect the level as well as the pattern of marginal costs..
This "pure" marginal-cost pricing scheme would require that prices vary almost
hourly and also differ among many groups of customers.
B. MITCHELL, W. MANNING & J. ACTON, PEAK-LOAD PRICING 18 (1978).

69. Spann, supra note 30, at 3.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 2624 (1982).
71. An in-kind subsidy is a subsidy linked to a particular good (in this case electricity) rather
than cash. There is evidence that such subsidies distort consumption patterns by inducing an
overconsumption of the subsidized good and an underconsumption of other goods. See E.
BROWNING & J. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 100-03 (1979).
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costs within the electric utility industry. In recent years, however, marginal costs have exceeded average costs.72 It is important that regulators structure rates in light of these altered cost conditions. Pricing at

marginal cost is still proper if modified by the inverse elasticity rule.73
Inverse elasticity means that in the elastic demand portions of the elec-

tricity market (industrial users) rates should be set at marginal cost in
order to provide the proper price signal. In the inelastic portions of the
market (residential users), rates should be lowered in order to keep revenues at the proper level.74 Under present cost conditions the residential customer would benefit from inverse elasticity pricing. A recent

court decision has upheld such a pricing policy against an attack that it
was discriminatory and sent the wrong price signals to many custom-

ers.75 The inverse elasticity concept has not received wide recognition
among state commissions.7 6

The enactment of title I of PURPA has engendered opposition
from various factions. States have been reluctant to yield their control
over electric power production and have felt that a rate structure
change would jeopardize their economic bases.77 Utilities have been
reluctant to embrace rate reform because of a perception that it might

affect their ability to compete for customers. 78 The U.S. Supreme
Court recently overruled a federal district court and upheld the consti-

tutionality of PURPA in a 5-4 decision. 79 The Court held that since
Congress, under the commerce clause, can pre-empt the states com72. See R. GORDON, REFORMING THE REGULATION OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES (1982); Krohm,

Growth and the Cost of Electric Power, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 18, 1980, at 32.
73. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 65, at 29; see 1 A. KAHN, supra note 12,
at 144; Huntington, supra note 55, at 743-45; Newburger, supra note 21, at 583.
74. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 65, at 29. The chief advantage of inverse elasticity in modifying marginal cost rates to produce average cost revenues is that it changes
rates in the manner that will least affect the consumption patterns resulting from marginal cost
pricing. The disadvantages are that income is redistributed and price elasticities of demand are
difficult to measure. Newburger, supra note 21, at 583.
75. Metropolitan Wash. Bd. of Trade v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 432 A.2d 343, 353-64 (D.C.
1981).
76. In Generic Hearings Regarding Electric Rate Structure, 36 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 6,
53, 56-57 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1979) the commission rejected the inverse elasticity rule and
stated that the price elasticities of demand of the relevant customers were too difficult to determine
accurately and that the benefits of marginal cost pricing might be lost. In Cost of Service Information, 43 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 451,469 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1981) the commission
rejected inverse elasticity because it bases prices on "a customer's characteristics of demand and
not the cost of providing service.
... Id
77. H.R. REP. No. 496, supra note 4, at 8572.
78. Id
79. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982) (reversing Mississippi v. FERC, 49
U.S.L.W. 2553 (S.D. Miss. 1981)).
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to
pletely in the regulation of electric utilities it could require states
80
utilities.
electric
of
regulation
their
in
standards
federal
consider
PURPA, even with its imperfections, is a step in the right direction
toward efficient pricing and hastens the recognition by state commissions of the harmful effects of declining block tariffs and automatic adjustment clauses
III.

NATURAL MONOPOLY RATIONALE

The preceding discussion of the effects of electric utility regulation
has demonstrated that regulation has probably caused as many
problems as it has cured. Yet if the electric utility industry is a decreasing cost industry, and a monopoly would be the natural result of market forces, then any attempt at regulation is justifiable. Professor
Demsetz has argued that even assuming a natural monopoly exists,
there is no reason why, in the absence of regulation, monopoly prices
have to be the result. 8 He argues that if economies of scale in production lead to one producer, they do not determine the number of rival
bidders or potential competitors for a franchise. As long as there are
no legal barriers to entry, transaction costs are trivial, collusion among
bidders is difficult, and inputs of production are accessible at market
prices, competition will prevail and the successful bidder will be forced
to charge a competitive price. No dead weight loss would occur, since
a different price structure, eliminating such a loss, could be proposed
by a competitor and thus be the winning bid.82 Existing production
be sold to the winning bidder, avoiding duplication of
assets could
83
investment.
Demsetz, however, assumes that natural monopoly characteristics
are present. Recent studies and historical evidence suggest that natural
monopoly characteristics may never have existed in the electric utility
industry. Curiously, the phrase "natural monopoly" was rarely used by
either the utilities or their critics during the period when state commis80. 456 U.S. at 765, 770-71.
81. Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & EcoN. 55, 57 (1968).
82. But see Meeks, supra note 15.
83. Demsetz has been criticized because a competitive rate of return is not synonymous with
efficiency, the supposed goal of regulation. A competitive bid would presumably be at average

cost, not marginal cost. Thus, some consumers would be willing to pay more for an additional
unit of output than it would cost to produce that output. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, stera note
39, at 9-10. Other criticisms of franchise bidding are (1) bidding would not prevent price discrimination; (2) bidding would increase uncertainty, possibly raising capital costs; and (3) bidding
would permit the dominant firm to strengthen its market position. Trebing, The Chicago School
versus Public Utility Regulation, 10 J. ECON. IssuEs 97, 115-18 (1976).
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sions were being formed. 84 Prior to that time, electric utilities were
regulated primarily by municipalities. Competition flourished under
municipal regulation. It was common policy to grant franchises to all
who applied and every major municipality issued many duplicate
franchises. 5 The competition induced by municipal regulation came
to be viewed as bad policy because utilities consolidated, local regulators succumbed to corruption, and duplicate franchises created uncertainty and chaos.
A recent empirical study by Professor Jarrell 8 6 compared the effectiveness of the early competitive regulatory environment with the subsequent regulation by state commissions. Jarrell compared municipally
regulated utilities with state regulated utilities in 1912. The results indicated that utilities under the competitive municipal environment had
forty-six percent lower prices, thirty-eight percent lower gross profits
and twenty-three percent higher output than utilities under state regulation. Furthermore, by 1917, after state regulation was established in
the competitive states, prices and profits rose and output fel. Competition was a more effective check on utilities than was regulation. These
figures raise serious doubts as to whether the electric utility industry is
actually a natural monopoly. Other evidence demonstrates that electric
utilities lobbied for state regulation in order to protect themselves from
competition and municipal takeovers. 87 Professor Kahn has pointed
out that the only factor in determining whether any firm exhibits natural monopoly characteristics is the presence of economies of scale.8 8
Large fixed costs are merely a possible symptom of such economies.
Agriculture is a high fixed cost industry, but efficiency permits many
individual farms to supply the market.8 9 Likewise, duplication of facilities is only inefficient in the presence of long run decreasing costs internal to one firm. The crux of the matter is whether two or more firms
have the same costs as a single firm in the same market. If this is the
84. R.

HELLMAN, GOVERNMENT COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY

60

(1972).
85. Jarrell, The Demandfor State Regulation ofthe Electric Utility Industry, 21 J. LAW &
ECON. 269, 273 (1978). See also 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 117-19.
86. Jarrell, supra note 85.
87. D. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 44.
88. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 119-23.
89. Typically the fixed assets associated with the electric utility industry have a long useful
life. One commentator has shown that "when useful life is taken into consideration the ratio of
output to capital requirements in electric utility firms does not vary significantly from those industries not remotely considered to be natural monopolies." Primeaux, Some Problems with Natural
Monopol,, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 63, 70 (1979).
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case, a natural monopoly does not exist.9"
The preceding discussion implies that it may be very difficult for
policymakers to determine whether true economies of scale are present.
It is in the interest of utility managers to give the impression of economies of scale so as to avoid competition and possible dissolution. This
self-interest, in combination with the regulated utility's incentive to increase rate bases or expand into new ventures, 9' makes it very difficult
to distinguish true increasing returns and the case of an overextended
excess-capacity system. 92 Utilities can make an argument that their
marginal costs of additional output are always lower than the total
costs of a new system. Only by comparing the full marginal costs of the
utility with that of a competitor can economies of scale be determined.
Furthermore, the regulatory regime functions as if the electric utility industry performed just one service and as if that service were a
natural monopoly, but the structure of the industry is not that simple.
The industry performs three services: the generation, transmission and
distribution of electricity. 93 The economic characteristics and competitive possibilities vary among the three sectors. The three services are
vertically integrated in about seventy-seven percent of privately-owned
utilities.94 The remainder of the industry is made up of hundreds of
small systems, usually publicly owned, operating only at the distribution level. Each service or functional level must be analyzed separately
to determine if economies of scale are present, particularly since there
appear to be few economies of scale associated with vertical
90. But see Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AMER. ECON.
REV. 966 (1975) who points out that subadditivity, not economies of scale, should be used to

provide a formal definition of natural monopoly. He gives the example of supplying water to
three towns. The cost of supplying one town is $300. The cost of supplying two towns jointly is
$400. The cost of supplying three towns jointly is $650. Thus, the total cost to three separate
companies of supplying all the water is $900. The total cost to two companies is $700. The total
cost to one company is $650. But any two neighborhoods can supply themselves at a lower average cost ($200 apiece) than they incur with joint supply to all ($216.67). Thus, monopoly is not the
inevitable result. Id at 969-70. See also R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 3-4 (1979); Baumol, On the ProperCost Testsfor NaturalMonopoly in a Multloroduct Industry, 67 AMER. ECON. REv. 809 (1977).

91. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (utilities purchasing coal mines).
92. Waverman, Regulation of.Intercity Telecommunications, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN
REGULATED MARKETS 206-07 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
93. Generation is the art of creating heat energy from fuel and converting that heat energy
into electricity. Transmission is the transportation of high voltage electricity between generators
or to bulk delivery points for distribution. Distribution is the delivery of low voltage electricity
over short distances to retail customers. Generation and transmission constitute the bulk-power
supply system.
94. Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 139 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
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integration. 95

A.

Economies of Scale in Generation

There has been a general consensus that economies of scale associated with power plant size once existed but have now been exhausted. 96
Recent studies conclude that while scale economies once existed in generation, by 1970 most firms had exhausted scale economies and that the
largest firms were experiencing scale diseconomies. 97 The studies also
found that the economies that once existed were not attributable to the
growth in generator size, and that there was little relationship between
the decline in costs and utility expansions. 9 Utilities with low growth
rates reduced costs as much as the fastest growing firms. 9 9 One study

concluded that technological change unrelated to increases in scale
caused the cost decreases'0° and that the electric power industry may be
characterized by substantial scale economies at moderate levels of output. A small number of very large multi-plant firms is unnecessary for
efficiency in production and may lead to inefficiency.10 1 Competition
in the wholesale bulk-power market is possible, since most urban regions could support several bulk-power firms large enough to take advantage of scale economies. Even if the minimum efficient firm size is
larger than these studies indicate, limiting the market to one or two
large firms in an urban region, scale economies could still be exploited
and competition sustained in the bulk-power exchange market 0 2
95. Id at 156.
96. H.R. REP. No. 496, supra note 4, at 8572. A natural monopoly exists when demand for
the firm's output never leaves the decreasing cost range of the firm's average cost functions.
Once it does for any length of time, the firm ceases to be a natural monopoly by economic definition. This points out the realistic fact that a natural monopoly does not have
an infinite life. That is, over time, demand may change and cause the demand curve to
shift into the increasing portion of the average cost functions, eliminating economies of
scale and terminating the natural monopoly status.
Fanara, Suelflow, & Draba, Energy and Competition: the Saga of ElectricPower, 25 ANTITRUST
BULL. 125, 135 (1980). A change in demand may result from such factors as an increase in income, an increase in population, or a redistribution of income towards groups who favor electricity consumption. Technological change may also lower the cost curves a sufficient amount to
cause a firm to cease being a natural monopoly.
97. See Christensen & Greene, Economies ofScale in U.S. ElectricPower Generation, 84 J.
POL. ECON. 655 (1976); Huettner & Landon, Electric Utilities: Scale Economies and Diseconomies,
44 S. ECON. J. 833 (1978).
98. Christensen & Greene, supra note 97, at 656.
99. Id
100. Id
101. This result is in sharp contrast to Weiss, supra note 94, at 136, who overstates the minimum efficient firm size and also contradicts Essay, Efficiency and Competition in the Electric-Power
Industry, 88 YALE L.J. 1511, 1513 (1979).
102. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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through a system of coordination among separately owned generating

plants, each having equal access to transmission and distribution.

°3

The size of the wholesale bulk-power supply market is limited by the

costs of transmission, which vary in proportion to the distance and inversely with the square of the transmission voltage.'t

4

Recent techno-

logical advances in high-voltage networks make it economical for
generating plants to serve large geographical areas.' 05 As an alternative, firms too small for efficiency could merge until the optimally efficient scale is reached, improving the prospect for real competition
among equally efficient suppliers. 1°" Therefore generation, which accounts for over one-half of the total costs of the industry, 0 7 is not a
natural monopoly because moderately sized firms exhibit economies of
scale and economies can be exploited either by a system of coordina-

tion among generating units or by a merger of inefficient, small firms.
B. Economies of Scale in Transmission andDistribution
The little empirical work which has been done relative to scale
economies in transmission is inconclusive. 08 Transmission is generally

thought to be a natural monopoly1 °9 Several transmission lines are
thought to be wasteful since voltage capacity increases by the square of

line size." 0 It is also true that additional right-of-ways are difficult to
acquire, and that ownership of transmission lines is critical to the competitive possibilities available in the industry."'
A natural monopoly has also long been thought to exist at the dis103. Weiss, supra note 94, at 136. A coordination system can also increase the efficiency and
reliability of several smaller firms within a region even if they, in fact, exhibit economies of scale.
Weiss also found that many locations have several alternative bulk-power suppliers close enough
to supply needed power. Id
104. Id
105. Meeks, supra note 15, at 74.
106. Christensen & Greene, An EconometricAssessment ofCost Savingsfram Coordinationin
U.S. ElectricPower Generation, 54 LAND ECON. 139 (1978). A statistical study of 138 firms using
1970 data revealed that jointly owned electric utilities had lower costs than individually owned
utilities. The study concluded that small firms should merge until efficient scale size is reached;
that mergers of large firms that have fully exploited scale economies would yield no cost savings
and would reduce competition; and that mergers among small utilities reap greater cost savings
than do formal power pools. Id at 152-53.
107. Weiss, supra note 94, at 135.
108. Huettner & Landon, supra note 97, at 893-95 found that increasing unit costs were statistically insignificant.
109. Weiss, supra note 94, at 144.
110. Id at 136.
111. A firm that controls transmission may employ pricing and marketing practices that favor
dependence on transmission facilities to assure its continued dominance. For example, a vertically integrated electric utility might impose a full requirements contract on a non-affiliated dis-
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tribution level. Since fixed costs make up eighty-five percent of total
distribution costs," 2 scale economies are dependent on load density
rather than on absolute size of the network.' 13 Efficiency does not preclude many small distribution firms from serving adjacent localities. A
recent study, however, found that the cost curve facing a distributor
becomes slightly U-shaped as the density of load increases beyond a
certain point in heavily populated areas.114 This indicates the potential
for direct competition between distributors in heavily populated areas.
Competition at the distribution level has historically been rather
intense when not prohibited by state territorial assignments." 15 Generally, such competition has taken the form of a duopoly between municipally-owned distributors and investor-owned distributors that are
vertically integrated. Professor Primeaux examined the natural monopoly cost structure at the distribution level and found that average
costs were actually less for municipal firms facing competition than for
municipal firms which did not compete." 16 This relationship held true,
however, only until an output frontier was reached at which the marginal costs of the competing firms were higher than the marginal costs of
the noncompeting firms. According to the study, most municipal and
private distribution firms were too small to reap the scale benefits of
monopoly; but they accounted for only fifteen percent of the total retail
sales of electricity. Admitting that monopoly firms could probably produce at lower costs than competitive firms, the study showed that they
t 7
fail to actually do so in the absence of competition."
Professor Hellman has also investigated competition in the retail
electricity market, as well as threatened municipal takeovers of private
tributor or deny a nonaffiliated distributor access to low-cost power. See infra notes 189-220 and
accompanying text.
112. Huettner & Landon, supra note 97, at 897 n.16.
113. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY 376 (1979).
114. The cost curve has a shape somewhat between a "U" and an "L." Huettner & Landon,
supra note 97, at 895-97.
115. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 116-19.
116. Primeaux, A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structurefor Electric Utilities, in
PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975). In another study,

Primeaux found there was no statistical difference between monopoly and duopoly market structures as they affect capacity utilization in the electric utility industry. Duopoly creates no more
excess generating capacity than monopoly. Primeaux, The Effect ofCompetition on Capacity Utilization in the Electric Utility Industry, 16 EcON. INQUIRY 237, 247 (1978). Professor Hellman compiled over 100 case studies examining all three forms of competition. R. HELLMAN, supra note 84,
at 228.
117. Primeaux, .4 Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structurefor Electric Utilities, in
PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
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distributors, whether by purchase or franchise expiration." 18 His study
concluded that private companies exposed to government competition

had lower rates and that their rates of return rose when compared to
companies not facing competition." 9 The distribution level therefore

seems to be a tenuous natural monopoly. There is a possibility of very
slight diseconomies of scale associated with distributors in regions that
are densely populated and great inherent inefficiencies associated with

distributors located primarily in regions requiring only moderate electric service.
IV.

COMPETITION AND COORDINATION

A. Needfor Competition and Coordination
In the early 1960's, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) recognized that benefits could be achieved through the interconnection and

coordination of utilities in such a way that efficiency and reliability
could be enhanced. 20 This phenomenon also illustrates that any existing scale economies can be exploited in generation, particularly at

2
the plant level. Several commentators have described these benefits.' '
They can be categorized into five groups: reserve sharing, economy
exchange, diversity exchange, central economic dispatch, and coordi-

nated system planning.

22

Electric utilities must maintain reserve generating capacity to meet

any contingencies that may arise such as mechanical breakdown,
scheduled maintenance shutdown, or underestimated peak demands.

This reserve can be a very large expenditure, perhaps twenty to twentyfive percent of existing capacity. 123 A greater number of interconnected

generators give rise to a smaller percentage of reserves needed per firm
since maintenance can be staggered and risks of breakdowns at peak
periods are reduced.
118. R. HELLMAN, supra note 84, at 228. Yardstick competition is competition by example. A
private distributor's performance and costs are compared to those of a contiguous municipal firm
acting as a benchmark. Many state regulatory commissions utilize this approach as a check on the
conventional regulatory process.
119. Id at 228. The rise in rates of return is attributable to a combination of lower prices,
elastic demand and declining costs. Id
120. 1 FEDERAL POWER COMM'N, NATIONAL POWER SURVEY 3 (1964).
121. Essay, supra note 101, at 1514-18. Hjelmfelt, Exclusive Service Territories, Power Pooling
andElectric Utility Regulations, 38 FED. B.J. 21, 28 (1979). S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, supra note
34, at 96, estimate that a one to two billion dollar cost saving per year would accrue by 1980 under
optimal coordination.
122. Essay, supra note 101, at 1514.
123. Hjelmfelt, supra note 121, at 28.
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Economy exchange exploits the marginal cost differential existing
among generators. Arrangements are made so that firms with higher
marginal production costs buy power from firms with lower marginal
generating costs at a price somewhere between the difference. The result is a lower cost of production. A large number of interconnected
plants enhances the possibilities for lower costs. Central economic dispatch is a highly technical method of utilizing this concept within a
formal pooling arrangement. Generating operations of the coordinated
system are managed by a central computer which continually utilizes
only the most economical generators as demand for electricity
fluctuates.
Diversity exchange is a means of leveling peak demand periods
among coordinated utilities. Since different utilities experience peaks
at different times, an exchange of power is possible, thereby allowing
each utility to reduce the capacity needed to meet its particular peak
demand.
Investment decisions can also be coordinated so that individual
firms are not left with excess capacity when new generating plants are
built. A single utility seeking to expand must build a generator as large
as the minimum efficient size required for scale economies. However,
if utilities coordinate investment plans and then stagger construction,
each utility's incremental demand can be met without undue excess

capacity.
One observer has suggested that the efficiency and reliability associated with coordination would be maximized by the merger of existing
utility firms into twelve or fifteen regional giants, each having a monopoly within its region.'2 4 Not only would this approach foreclose the
benefits that accrue from competition, it would also cause diseconomies
of scale given the empirical evidence.' 2 5 There are two alternatives to
large multi-plant firms: pools' 2 6 or individually negotiated contracts
between interconnected firms. A recent study by Christensen and
Greene indicates that formal pooling relationships have no demonstrated cost advantages over informal relationships or arms-length
transactions.127 Technologically, the opportunity exists for electric util124. Cook, Co-ordination and the Small Electric Power System, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 23,
1967, at 19, 24.
125. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
126. "[P]ooling generally refers to more formalized agreements to secure economy of bulk
power supply through reserve sharing, joint planning, and coordinated operation." FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, POWER POOLING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (FERC-0049, 1981).
127. Christensen & Greene, supra note 106.
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ities to coordinate informally. Most generating plants are connected to
other plants within their area. 2 8 Nevertheless, there is evidence that
coordinating opportunities have not yet been fully exploited. 129
Competition among electric utilities would undoubtedly benefit
the industry. The Supreme Court has said that competition leads to the
"best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress .. .,. In competitive
markets prices respond quickly to cost changes and there is no regulatory lag period reducing the allowed rate of return during inflationary
periods. Capital markets in a free economy have enough flexibility to
attract investors. Competitive pressures can serve as a constraint on
rate-base inflation, the maintenance of excess capacity, the disincentives for efficiency associated with automatic adjustment clauses, the
propensity toward cost inflation and the ability to shift risk onto the
consumer. Competitive pressures also identify artificial restrictions on
the size of markets. In addition, competition puts a dynamic pressure
on firms to explore the slope of their cost functions and the elasticity of
their demand. Competition forces firms to pursue technological
inno3
vations and thus improve the quality of services provided.' '
The difficult question is whether the economies associated with coordination are sacrificed by the introduction of competition. Is there
an inherent conflict within the industry when utilities both compete
and cooperate? In order to examine these questions it is necessary to
understand how the industry is structured and determine where competition presently and potentially exists.
B. Interface of Competition and Coordination
1. Industry Structure
The structural trend within the electric utility industry has been
128. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 18.
129. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 126, at 9. Fewer major utilities are
members of pools today than in 1970, though small utility participation has slightly increased.

The number of informal arrangements has not risen appreciably.
130. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
131. Trebing,Broadening the Objectives ofPublic Utiliy Regulation, 53 LAND EcoN. 106, 108

(1977). A recent study was made of various combination utilities competing with straight electrics
to determine the effect of competition on x-inefficiency at the generation level. X-inefficiency is

the employment of inputs in excess of the minimum resource requirements for production. The
study concluded that competitive pressure led to the enforcement of higher levels of efficiency on
the work forces of combination utilities. Stevenson, X-ineiciency and Intefrm Rivalry: Evidence
from the Electric Utility Industry, 58 LAND ECON. 52, 64 (1982). See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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toward greater concentration and vertical integration among a declining number of investor-owned utilities. 132 All but a few of the 100
largest investor-owned utilities are vertically integrated. Although this
integration apparently is the result of historical occurrences, it has become a rather useful tool in recent years in maintaining monopoly
power. For technical and economic reasons, generating facilities had to
be located near customers. "It made sense [originally] to have a single
owner for all facilities and thus the industry pattern was set."' 133 However, the economies of vertical integration do not seem great.134 The
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity require different
types of management and equipment. Any possible reliability enhancement due to vertical integration could be offset by a system of
coordination. Furthermore, vertical integration permits an inefficient
generating plant to supply its captive distributor, in order to make a
contribution to the firm's rate base.
z
Municipal utilities are much larger in number (roughly 2,200)' 3
but relatively small in size. Typically, municipal utilities are operated
exclusively as distributors. "The most common pattern is for a relatively large vertically integrated system to serve an extensive geographic area, with several smaller

. . .

municipal systems existing as

islands within the larger system's sphere of operation and frequently
purchasing all or part of their power at wholesale from the larger system."' 136 In recent years, because of the conflicts and financial
some municipal sysproblems associated with investor-owned utilities,
37
tems have invested in their own generators.'
2. Competitive Possibilities
It has been suggested that opportunities exist for competition in
the electric utility industry at both the generation and distribution
levels.' 38 These levels also serve to divide markets. The bulk supply
market, i.e., the generation and transmission of electricity, can be gen132. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 18. In 1976, there were less than 366
investor-owned utilities, down from 1401 in 1937. H.R. REP. No. 496, supra note 4, at 8570.
133. Id

134. Weiss, supra note 94, at 156-57.
135. Pace & Landon, supra note 14, at 7.
136. Meeks, supra note 15, at 68-69.
137. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 18. Currently, municipal systems own
less than 10% of installed generation capacity. But "over 13 of the generating capacity scheduled
to come on line during the 1980's will be publicly owned." Id See also infra notes 198-99 and
accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
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erally linked with the wholesale market for electricity. The exception
to this link is the generation and transmission of electricity to large
industrial users which is considered a part of the retail market. Distribution of electricity can be generally linked with the retail market for
electricity.
The wholesale bulk-power market can be broken down into sales
for resale to distribution companies and sales to the power exchange
market. 139 Theoretically, three forms of competition exist in the sales
for resale portion of the market: (1) competition among large private
utilities to supply retail distribution systems, (2) competition between
municipal and private bulk-power suppliers to serve retail distributors,
and (3) competition between wholesale suppliers and the power exchange market as alternative sources for part of the supply needs of
distribution systems. The lattermost would require distributors to go
directly to the power exchange market for a portion of their requirement. In reality there has been limited competition between private
and public bulk suppliers. Competition among generating firms is impeded by the ownership of transmission and distribution systems by
individual firms. Transactions actually involving "wheeling"' 140 are
mostly voluntary. Wheeling can be compelled only under very limited
circumstances.
A recent study of competition between a private and a public bulk
supplier revealed that both competition and coordination co-existed. 141
Private generating firms facing competition from a generation cooperative142 were forced to hold wholesale prices below fully distributed
costs. Despite the presence of competition, however, every government
bulk-power supplier was interconnected and coordinated with neighboring private systems.
The power exchange portion of the wholesale bulk-power market
would almost certainly foster both competition and coordination since
it produces economic gain for all participants. Besides coordination139. Trebing, supra note 43, at 97. The power exchange market involves sales and purchases
of generation and transmission capacity to achieve optimal coordination. Id
140. Wheeling involves electricity generated by one firm, transmitted by a second firm and
then delivered to a third party. The generating utility receives payment from the customer and the
wheeling firm receives payment for the use of its transmission lines. See infra notes 201-20 and
accompanying text.
141. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 126, at 64.

142. Cooperative systems are primarily distribution systems which are financed by the Rural
Electrification Administration (REA) to provide electricity to consumers in rural areas. Several
generation cooperative systems also receive REA assistance.
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exchange possibilities, 143 there would also be extensive competition for

individual unit sales and ownership interests in the power exchange
market.

The retail market can be subdivided into five categories of competition: (1) interfuel competition in the residential, commercial and industrial retail markets, (2) franchise competition in the same retail
markets, (3) fringe area competition for loads located on the periphery
of utility service areas, (4) industrial load competition, and (5) yard-

stick competition in all retail areas.
Bulk-power suppliers, as well as distributors, face interfuel competition. Studies indicate that there is significant competition between gas
and electric energy suppliers. Combination utilities, those selling both
gas and electricity, have higher rates and sell less power than those

utilities selling only electric energy and serving a different market, the
so called "straight electrics."'

44

This result suggests that spirited com-

petition exists between suppliers of the two fuels. Since inter-fuel coordination does not exist, there is no conflict between coordination and

competition. A conflict may exist between combination and straight
electric firms, but combination firms make 45up only a small share of the
market and probably should be divested.'
Franchise competition involves the right to serve a designated geographic area. Franchise competition exists only with respect to munici-

pal takeovers of investor-owned distribution facilities. Procedurally, a
municipality must first condemn the investor-owned distributor. Some

states, however, do not confer the right of eminent domain upon municipalities 4 6 and thus totally preclude this threat.
Fringe area competition occurs for loads in close proximity to ad-

jacent service areas of otherwise non-competitive utilities. Approxi143. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
144. Weiss, supra note 94, at 140-42. Another study using 1968 data for 72 cities concluded:
[Tlhere is a substantial degree of potential price competition between electricity and gas
in residential markets. Since large industrial firms have the option of buying gas and
generating their own electric power if commercial electric rates are too high, it is likely
that at some point potential competition exists in that market as well.
Landon & Wilson, An EconomicAnalysis of Combination Utilities, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 237, 260
(1972).
145. A statistical study confirms that combination utilities have greater monopoly power than
straight electric utilities. Combination utilities usually engage in less promotional activity, charge
higher prices, and have higher expenses. In addition, the customers of combination utilities appear to use less electricity. Collins, Comparative Performance of Combination andSeparately Managed Electric Utilities, 40 S. ECON. J. 80 (1973). Combination utilities are also inefficient when
compared to straight electrics. Landon & Wilson, supra note 144.
146. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 126, at 63.
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mately forty states have territorial legislation 147 prohibiting fringe
competition for presently existing loads, such as a housing development
or industry located on the utility's service border. Such legislation is
not justified. If a natural monopoly exists at the distribution level,
thereby making a duplication of facilities wasteful, then a technical
barrier to entry precludes the necessity of a legal one. A potential rival
will not contest an existing supplier knowing that his costs will exceed
those of his competitor until he captures at least fifty percent of the
market. The potential rival would have to finance his competitive activity with profits earned elsewhere to accomplish such a feat. It would
only be rational to do this if the existing supplier charged too much or
provided inadequate service. This is exactly the situation in which
competition should be allowed. There is a possibility of direct competition if a large, vertically integrated utility seeks to drive a smaller utility
out of business. This involves predatory pricing which is a matter controlled by the antitrust laws. Such exclusive service territories are unnecessary and inhibitive. Generally, as a result of antitrust legislation,
utilities will only compete for new loads locating near their service
areas.
Industrial load competition occurs to attract or retain large industrial loads within a designated service area. High industrial elasticities
of demand suggest that this is an area of viable competition. 148 Yardstick competition is derived from an economic comparison of a public
utility with a private utility. It may include direct price comparisons or
inter-firm comparisons. Professor Hellman has extensively documented the incentives yardstick competition creates for utilities to re49
duce costs and lower rates.
Taken as a whole, the evidence is mixed as to the effect of retail
competition on coordination. According to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission licensing board, one pool arrangement was abandoned by
a number of private utilities because of a concern that municipal utilities would become members.' 5 ° Instead, a series of bilateral agree147. Hjelmfelt, supra note 121, at 21 n.1. See, e.g., Matter of Certain Territorial Boundaries,
281 N.W.2d 65 (S.D. 1979), where a state statute requiring the state commission to assign exclusive service areas to electric utilities was upheld against a state constitutional attack even though
appellant/customer could obtain power more cheaply elsewhere. See also Gulf States Utilities
Co. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n, 381 So. 2d 432 (La. 1980) (court upheld territorial service
legislation).
148. Weiss, supra note 94, at 143-44.
149. R. HELLMAN, supra note 84.
150. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 126, at 64.
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ments were formed between the private companies. However, one
major pool (New England Pool-NEPOOL) was formed to include
many public and private utilities. 5 ' Yet territorial restrictions in several of the states where NEPOOL is located foreclosed retail competition to a great extent. In Florida, both public and private utilities have
formed a brokerage system called Florida Electric Power Coordinating
Group to facilitate the exchange of power. That group has
avoided the
2
usual deadlock through bilateral wheeling agreements.Other areas of potential competition remain to be explored. For
example, new and differentiated services could be created offering a
greater range of reliability at prices reflecting the differing grades of
reliability. Such an offering would be attractive in the retail-industrial
market as well as the wholesale bulk-power markets. 53 Another area
of competition involves the technological displacement of conventional
utility services through power produced close to the point of consumption.15 4 Heat pumps, windmills, fuel cells, and solar energy fall into
this category. Since technology has always been the enemy of monopoly, these sources will be competitive threats in the future.
A final area of competition involves co-generation. 55 Co-generation is not a new phenomenon, but given the high cost of energy it
appears ready for a new acceptance. In 1950, co-generated electricity
accounted for seventeen percent of the United States total. Yet in 1974,
co-generation supplied only four percent of the total.'5 6 Co-generation
is feasible as a source of power on a competitive basis both at the retail
level as self-generation and at the wholesale bulk-power level if transmission facilities are available. The sharp decline in the use and production of co-generation is partially attributable to the extremely low
prices utilities have been willing to pay industrial suppliers for their
surplus energy. Utilities have shown little interest in purchasing energy
which cannot be included in their rate base. This lack of demand has
depressed prices to the point of discouraging production. In addition, a
co-generator which provides electricity to a utility runs the risk of being
151. Id
152. See Plummer, A Different Approach to Electricity Deregulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 7,
1983, at 16.
153. Trebing, supra note 43, at 101.
154. id at 102.
155. Co-generation is the production of electricity from hot industrial-process steam before or
after it has performed its function in the factory. Co-generation is fuel efficient since the heat
performs a double function. See P. LEBEL, supra note 17, at 525.
156. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 65, at 52.
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considered a public utility and thereby subject to state and federal
regulation.
A documented case study illustrates the above problem.' 57 Pacific
Gas and Electric (PG&E), a large investor-owned utility, purchased energy until 1976 from a Georgia-Pacific pulp mill at a price of 2.5
mills/kwh. In 1976, Georgia-Pacific sought a higher price from PG&E.
When PG&E refused, Georgia-Pacific agreed to sell energy to Northern California Power Agency (NCPA), a coalition of public distributors, for a price of 7.5 mills. However, the parties needed PG&E's
wheeling services to transmit the energy thirty-five miles to an NCPA
member city. PG&E refused to wheel since it wanted to retain the
member city as a captive wholesale customer. Pacific Gas and Electric,
under threat of an antitrust suit, raised its offering price for the Georgia-Pacific power to between fourteen and twenty mills. This price was
still below the marginal cost of PG&E's generated power. 158
Title II, section 210 of PURPA was enacted in 1978 to prevent
utilities from inhibiting the development of co-generation by purchasing at too low a price or by refusing to wheel.' 59 The Act requires a
utility to offer to purchase electricity from qualifying co-generators and
other small power producers at a price not greater than an amount
equal to the utility's "avoided cost," the amount it would have cost the
utility to produce the power itself or buy it from another source. 16 0
Under the Act, qualifying small power producers and co-generators
may be exempt in whole or in part by FERC from federal and state
regulation respecting rates and financial structure if FERC deems it
necessary to encourage co-generation.' 6 1 The Act also gives FERC authority to order the interconnection of a co-generation facility or small
power producer with any electric utility, provided efficiency, reliability
1 62
or conservation are enhanced.
The Commission has promulgated
63
rules pursuant to the Act.
Recently, the Supreme Court overruled a court of appeals' deci6
sion vacating two FERC rules governing co-generation facilities. 1
157. Essay, supra note 101, at 1537 n.135.
158. Id
159. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982).
160. Id § 824a-3(b).
161. Id § 824a-3(e).
162. Id § 824i.
163. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.101-.602 (1983).
164. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd,
American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983).
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One rule requires that utilities purchase electricity from qualifying co-

generators and small producers at a rate that equals each utility's full
avoided cost.'6 1 In defense of the rule, FERC argued that (1) a split-

ting of the savings between the co-generator and the utility would result in a utility-type regulation of the co-generator's rates which
PURPA was designed to avoid, (2) rate reductions to utility customers
from a split-the-savings approach would be minimal, (3) allocating all
the savings to co-generators would provide a needed incentive for a
higher growth rate of these technologies, and (4) there was considerable
avoided costs since
difficulty in setting an appropriate rate less than full
66
co-generators.
in
used
are
technologies
different
The court of appeals found these reasons inadequate and vacated
the rule for failing to clarify how rates set at full avoided costs are
consistent with the statutory criteria for determining appropriate rates.
That criteria includes a consideration of the public interest, the interests of the co-generators, and the interests of the consumers of electricity.167 The court reasoned that a lower rate formula would still induce

small producers to develop and yet would also allow consumers a lower
price. The appeals court also stated that FERC should take into account the existence of competitive forces in determining the degree of
regulation necessary. If a competitive market is found by the commission to exist, the court reasoned that regulation would be unnecessary
since the rate set by market forces would best serve all interests.' 68 The
Supreme Court, however, agreed with FERC and upheld the rule. The
Court found the rule to be noncoercive, noting that a waiver of the rule
can be granted by any state regulatory authority and any nonregulated
utility. 169 As an alternative, a co-generator and a utility can privately

negotiate to set a price lower than the full avoided cost rate.17
The other FERC rule passed upon by the Court requires electric
utility to interconnect with any qualifying co-generator or small producer as may be necessary to complete purchases and sales. 7 This
rule allows co-generators to transmit electricity to a utility at will and
thereby bypass the procedural and substantive provisions of PURPA
requiring FERC to consider the impact of an interconnection upon a
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) (1983).
675 F.2d at 1233-34.
Id
Id. at 1236.
American Paper Instit., Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 1929-30 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.403 (1983)).
American Paper Instit., Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 1930.
18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c)(1) (1983).
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utility"'2 and requiring FERC to give notice and an evidentiary hearing
prior to the issuance of an interconnection order. 73 The court of appeals strictly interpreted the statutory provisions in holding that the
rule was inconsistent with PURPA.' 74 The Supreme Court upheld the
rule noting that the statutory procedures were too costly for small cogenerators. The Court stated that:
PURPA may reasonably be interpreted to forbid the Commission to exempt qualifying [co-generator] facilities from being the target of applications under the FPA [Federal Power
Act] for orders 'requiring

. .

. [a] physical connection,' . . .

but not to forbid the Commission to grant qualifying [co-generator] facilities the right to obtain interconnections
without
75
applying for an order under the FPA.'
The decision of the United States Supreme Court regarding the
full avoided cost rule is problematic. In order to assess the correctness
of the decision the attending benefits to co-generators must be balanced
against the costs to consumers. In addition, the difficulty of ascertaining an appropriate rate less than full avoided costs must be weighed
against the reduction in incentives for utilities to bargain for the cheapest power under the full avoided cost rule. Obviously, co-generators
must acquire at least a large percentage of electric utilities' avoided
costs if they are to be a competitive force. An important additional
problem in promoting co-generation is that presently PURPA's benefits
extend only to small producers. If competition is to be promoted and
the public welfare increased, utilities should be required to purchase
from large producers also. There is no economic reason why the development of large producers should be foreclosed. Nevertheless, the
172. 16 U.S.C. § 824k (1982).
173. Id § 824i(b).
174. 675 F.2d at 1239. Generally a hearing is needed to determine whether a proposed interconnection between utilities: is in the public interest, encourages energy or capital conservation,
optimizes use of facilities or improves system reliability. 16 U.S.C. § 824i(c) (1982). Interconnections may also be disallowed if they impair the functioning of electric utilities or co-generators.
Id. § 824k(a)(4).
175. American PaperInst., Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 1932. A state commission recently facing the
issues ruled upon by the Supreme Court stated: "[a]ll things considered, there are more good
reasons to support a 90 percent avoided cost rule than a full avoided cost rule. However, since full
avoided cost is the 'law of the land' for the foreseeable future, this commission should adhere to
it." Co-generators and Small Power Producers. 51 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 369, 385 (Ark. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1983). The Arkansas Commission ordered that for capacity built or begun after
November 9, 1978, the full avoided cost rule should apply. Capacity built or begun before November 9, 1978 was subject to the 90% rule. Id The commission also noted that "[t]he interconnection rule should be adopted by this commission, whether the FERC interconnection rule
remains in effect or not." Id at 387.
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Court's holding concerning interconnection is encouraging as there are
no adverse effects flowing from a general requirement to interconnect
and transmit electricity. A contrary decision would only burden cogenerators and impede low cost coordination.
If co-generation is to take a more dominant role in energy production, the bias in favor of rate base inclusion must be eliminated. Only
unrestrained competition at the generation level will enhance the demand for co-generation and thus benefit all participants. However,
there is no reason why coordination between private co-generators and
public utility generators should be hindered.
C. Hindrancesto Competition and Coordination
Any existing tensions between competition and coordination do
not flow from an inherent conflict. Rather, such tensions exist because
of the regulatory scheme imposed upon the industry and because of the
present structure of the industry. The nature of the regulatory scheme
impedes competition and coordination in several ways. First, the conflicting statutory regulations between states deter interstate coordinating activities.' 76 Second, rate regulation undermines coordination
between utilities since it encourages capital investment while discouraging cost containment. Third, regulatory lag in an inflationary environment hinders price competition.1 77 Electricity buyers will have a
hard time comparing prices between states and determining where
prices will eventually fall. Fourth, by imposing a monopoly status
upon the industry, regulation has buttressed many anti-competitive
strategies employed by large investor-owned utilities. Finally, since the
industry is vertically integrated, any justifiable attempt by regulators to
control one service level may be vertically extended to other levels.
The organizational structure of the industry has also fostered anticompetitive strategies by large private utilities. Such strategies have
included territorial allocation provisions, provisions that prohibit the
resale of wholesale power, long term full requirements contracts, price
squeezes, restrictions on entry to power pools and refusals to wheel

power.
Often electric power suppliers enter into market-sharing agreements that allocate territories for wholesale power sales or restrict or
prohibit the resale of wholesale power. These agreements severely re176. Essay, supra note 101, at 1520. See also Meyer & Leland, supra note 27.
177. Hjelmfelt, supra note 121, at 32.
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duce potential competition at the wholesale level. In the past, neither
the FPC nor state commissions have shown interest in attacking territo-

rial divisions. 7 ' In one case, however, the United States Department

of Justice obtained a settlement by consent decree eliminating territo-

rial restrictions on the sale of bulk power. 7 9 It is unclear whether antitrust laws will be enforced against electric utilities making such

agreements. 8" FERC has invalidated contracts that prohibit the further wholesaling of power by wholesale customers.' 8 ' In any event,
elimination of these agreements, by itself, will have little effect as long
as utilities refuse to wheel power and state territorial restrictions continue to exist.

Vertically integrated investor-owned utilities also impose long
term full requirements contracts on unaffiliated distributors. This practice utilizes dependence on transmission facilities to assure its effect.
Typically, the contract prohibits the power distributor from obtaining
power from other utilities. 8 2 These contracts are often reinforced by
provisions prohibiting purchasers, usually municipal distributors, from
reselling that power. In effect, this precludes the possibility that a
purchasing municipal distributor will compete for industrial loads.
Historically, FERC has not attacked these practices.
Vertically integrated utilities have also been accused of selling
wholesale electricity to municipal distributors at a price equal to or
above the price the utility sets for its retail customers. Such a practice
is termed a price squeeze and its primary purpose is to foreclose competition at the retail level. Whether real or potential, price squeezes

have a deterrent effect upon a municipal utility's ability to attract and
compete for industrial loads. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
178. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co., 71 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 3d 362, 364-65 (Fla. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1967) (territorial agreement between municipal utility and private utility upheld as
in the public interest since duplication of facilities was eliminated. The dissent argued that the
effect of the decision was to eliminate competition between the parties and regulation of the parties. Id at 366); Rural Elec. Convenience Coop. Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 75 Ill. 2d 142, -,
387 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1979), modofed, 109 Ill. App. 3d 243, 440 N.E.2d 404 (1982) (service agreement between electric cooperative and other utility deemed lawful); City of Lincoln v. Neb. Pub.
Power Dist., 191 Neb. 556, 216 N.W.2d 722 (1974) (state commission approved service agreements
between municipal utility and public power district).
179. United States v. Fla. Power Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,637 (D. Fla. 1971).
180. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
181. Louisiana Power & Light Co., Opin. No. 110, Docket No. ER77-533 (Phase 1), Jan. 28,
1981, modfed and reh'g. denied Opin. No. 110-A, June 24, 1981.
182. Given the high capital costs associated with unused capacity, a contract giving the supplier adequate notice before terminating a wholesale arrangement involving a large block of electricity seems justifiable. Yet, the time length specified in the contract should be no longer than is
necessary to allow the supplier to absorb or dispose of the otherwise unused capacity.
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FPC must consider whether wholesale 83
rates set by utilities are discrimi-

natory and anti-competitive in effect.'
As a defense to a price squeeze charge in a federal court, one inte-

grated utility claimed that diverse regulatory procedures precluded parity between wholesale and retail rates.' 8 4 The utility premised its

argument on the fact that federal and state commissions have adopted
different procedures. Wholesale rates are effective immediately upon

filing a rate application subject to a refund if disapproved at a subsequent hearing.1 85 Retail rates, however, must await approval before

becoming effective. The utility argued, therefore, that its proposed
state retail rate was the appropriate rate to be used in a comparison
with the federal rate rather than the existing state rate. The proposed

state rate would of course be higher than the existing one under present
economic conditions and therefore above the wholesale rate. The court

ruled that the existing retail rate was the appropriate benchmark since
the proposed rate was too speculative and probably would not be

granted in full anyway. The rate comparison evidenced sufficient proof
of a price squeeze in violation of the Sherman Act.' 8 6 The court found
that the price squeeze injured the municipal utility by inhibiting both
the attraction of new business customers at the retail level and the acquisition of other municipal distributor systems. However, antitrust
183. See FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276-77 (1979). As of June 1976, 49 price
squeeze cases involving utilities in 27 states were pending before the FPC. Fairman & Scott,
Transmission,PowerPools, and Competitionin the Electric Utility Industry, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1159,
1173 n.55 (1977).
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has determined that a firm discriminates when
the difference between its wholesale and retail rates are not based on a difference in costs. Union
Elec. Co., 39 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 300 (FERC 1980). Thus, price discrimination can be
ascertained only by considering the costs underlying the rates. A rebuttable presumption arises
that a wholesale rate has anti-competitive effects if price discrimination exists, if the wholesale
supplier and customer are in the same geographic proximity and if there are or could be alternative suppliers of electricity for the same load. Only the potential for an anti-competitive effect is
necessary to establish a price squeeze case. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 315, 323-24 (FERC 1979). See also Holmes, First Generation PriceSqueeze Policy at
the FERC, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 30, 1982, at 32. However, existing price discrimination nust
be undue to be unlawful. See, Pennsylvania Power Co., 50 Pub. UtiL Rep. (PUR) 4th 635, 640
(FERC 1983). "The only [price squeeze] remedy the FERC can grant is to reduce the wholesale
price to the lower end of the 'zone of reasonableness'." City of Kirkwoodv. Union Elec. Co., 671
F.2d 1173, 1178 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 814 (1983). FERC has decided as a general rule
not to lower wholesale rates to the lower end of the zone of reasonableness to remedy differences
between federal rate making policies and procedures and those of a state commission. Pennsylhania Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th at 639.
184. City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 1096, reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981).
185. Under section 205 of the Federal Power Act, a maximum five month suspension can be
ordered by FERC, 16 U.S.C. 824d(e) (1982).
186. City of Mishawaka, 616 F.2d at 983-86.
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treble damages were not awarded given the peculiar circumstance of
dual regulation in the electric utility industry. Instead, the court only
awarded damages measured by the federal regulatory statute 18 7 providing for compensatory refunds to wholesale customers upon a determination by FERC that a filed rate was excessive. The court stated that
the possibility of treble damages existed following a price squeeze only
after proof of specific injuries suffered by the municipal utility as a result of an integrated utility's monopolistic behavior.188 Under this reasoning, an integrated utility may be able to engage in a price squeeze
and risk losing only the judicially determined excess amount charged to
the distributor.
The ownership and control of transmission services fosters and
sustains the most important anti-competitive strategies employed by
large vertically integrated utilities. Utilities controlling the transmission of electricity can shape the actions of potential competitors by denying access to low-cost sources of power. This may take the form of a
denial of access to power pools, a refusal to wheel power, or excessive
wheeling charges. These practices, in effect, either force the municipal
distributor to take its full requirements from the integrated firm or
build a generator smaller than the minimum efficient size necessary to
exploit economies of scale.
Pooling has been recognized by Congress as a means of enhancing
coordination, thus making possible the low-cost production of electricity. As a result, Congress has authorized FERC to promote and encourage interconnection and coordination within geographical
districts. 8 9 Conflicts over pool membership, however, have arisen between large vertically integrated private utilities and small municipal
utilities. Small utilities generally stand to benefit substantially from
pool membership but have little to contribute in terms of capital assets.
The result has been that large utilities have extended membership to
small systems only if they agree to contribute to the pool on the basis of
the benefits they receive rather than the actual cost of interconnection.1 0 This policy effectively forecloses municipal distributors from
pooling arrangements and inhibits competition at the retail level. If a
187. Id (applying 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1982)).
188. Id at 989-90. But see City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763
(D. Del. 1979) which implied that treble damages could not be awarded in a price squeeze action
under any circumstances. Newark is probably the majority view. In any case, the burden of
proving specific damages is prohibitively high.
189. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a)-(f) (1982).
190. Trebing, supra note 43, at 104. Meeks, supra note 15, at 108.
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municipal utility has any generating capability, federal courts have insisted that it be admitted into a pool provided it pays for the true value
of the transmission services used, whether in kind or in cash. 191 In addition, small generating systems cannot be assessed a disproportionate
amount by a pool for not maintaining a minimum capacity level.
These small192systems can only be charged an amount equal to the actual
deficiency.

In general, the courts and Congress have recognized "that power
pooling arrangements, rather than unrestrained competition between
electric facilities are in the public interest."' 93 As a result, pools are
presumed to be voluntarily negotiated and the presence or absence of
certain discriminatory and anti-competitive provisions within the pooling contract are tolerated. 94 Some pools are indeed voluntary, allowing members to make exchanges with non-members and to compete
with one another at the generation and distribution level. Under such
circumstances coordination can compliment competition. NEPOOL,
for instance has opened its membership to any utility regardless of size
with no apparent conflict between coordination and competition.' 95
Yet most pools, unlike NEPOOL, have membership restrictions and
conflicts. Moreover, management decisions are usually made by committees rather than individuals and unanimous consent is often needed
before any action can be taken. 196 Pools, however, are not the only
191. Gainesville Util. Dep't v. Fla. Power Corp., 402 U.S. 515 (1971); Central Iowa Power v.
FERC, 606 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
192. Municipalities of Groton v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
193. CentralIowa Power, 606 F.2d at 1162.
194. Pool agreements need not provide for firm power sales:
Under firm power sales, a utility promises to transmit to a wholesale distributor a specified amount of power with the same level of reliability as is provided in the utility's retail
service. In contrast, under a 'unit power' sale-for which the agreement does provide-a
utility promises to deliver a certain portion of its production from a particular generating
unit; if the unit is not operating no power is dispatched.
Municipalitiesof Graton, 587 F.2d at 1298. Courts have reasoned that pricing schedules restricting
competition between pooling members are lawful since they are reasonably necessary to ensure
that costs and benefits are shared in a fair and predictable manner. CentrallowaPower, 606 F.2d
at 1163.
195. Fairman & Scott, supra note 183, at 1195.
196. As one commentator has noted:
[P]ools require complex, hard-to-achieve agreements that balance the interests and obligations of their members. They are difficult to form and difficult to operate. Probably
the most important shortcoming of the power pools is that they lack a mechanism for
creating the transmission network that would allow more economic dispatch of the region. Typically, no one has the economic incentive to eliminate transmission bottlenecks. Transmission planning and development is usually difficult, slow, and
contentious.
Berry, supra note 7, at 16.
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means to achieve efficient coordination. 197
In recent years, as the private integrated utilities have suffered severe capital losses under rate regulation, municipal utilities have invested in new, unfinished construction projects begun by the private
systems. The result has been an increase in joint ownership of generating units by investors and publicly-owned utilities. One prominent example is the case of Georgia Power' 98 whose bond issue of 1974 failed
to sell at a yield of 11 , 1.8 points above the market average for "Baa"
utility bonds. Only when Georgia Power agreed to allow a cooperative
utility to participate in the combined construction and ownership of
five new generating units did construction begin. Thereafter, the Rural
Electrification Administration loaned money at a discounted interest
rate to finance the construction. Later in 1976, Georgia Power was
again unable to raise sufficient capital and therefore sold a fifty percent
ownership interest to several publicly owned utilities.
Although few publicly-owned systems have recently entered into
joint ventures with private integrated systems, it appears to be an attractive means of raising capital since low-cost loans and tax exempt
bonds support the construction projects. 199 The end result is that some

small publicly owned utilities are able to share in the coordinating benefits accruing to the large systems. Despite this benefit, a trend toward
combined public-private ownership would be unfortunate. Jointly
owned utilities are an example of a restrictive pooling arrangement.
All the problems associated with cost allocations and managerial inefficiencies are inherent in such a system. Moreover, previously cited empirical work has revealed that further scale economies do not exist at
the firm level for large integrated firms.2 " Perhaps most importantly,

existing competition would be seriously undermined since public-private ownership would enhance vertical integration, disadvantage utilities supported only by private money, and hide inefficiency and high
costs in taxes.
Refusals to wheel power have been another major hindrance to
competition and coordination. As early as 1935 Congress passed a statute directing the FPC to promote voluntary interconnection and coor197. See Christensen & Greene, supra note 106 and accompanying text.
198. Fanara, Suelflow, & Draba, supra note 96, at 131-33.
199. "At the end of 1979, 60 generating units in service were owned by more than one utility,
as compared to 15 in 1970 and 5 in 1965. The number ofjointly owned plants may exceed 100 by
1990, . . ." REPUBLICAN STAFF, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., WORKING PAPER: FEDERAL POWER
ACT REFORM 1 (Mar. 21, 1983).
200. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
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dination of electric-power facilities.2"' However, the specific language
imposing common carrier obligations on transmission line owners was
deleted.2" 2 As enacted, the statute gave no authority to the Commission to order wheeling, compel formation of power pools or enforce the
antitrust laws against the electric utility industry.
Enforcement of the antitrust laws has come from a different direction. Under a 1970 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,203
the United States Department of Justice was given a role in the licensing of nuclear power plants. Before granting a license, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is required to seek the advice of the
Justice Department concerning the license's competitive effect.2" This
has resulted in requests by the Antitrust Division for hearings on antitrust issues concerning not only participation by municipals in nuclear
20 5
projects, but also their access to transmission systems and pools.

Many applicants avoid the hearings by negotiating license conditions.
Often applicants agree to interconnect with municipal utilities, share
reserves with them, or wheel for them.20 6 For several reasons, this approach is not entirely satisfactory. First, the NRC has no leverage relative to coordination beyond antitrust situations. Second, as with any
antitrust remedy, the pre-licensing negotiation process seeks to extract
services from a reluctant monopolist without changing the incentives
that discourage voluntary coordination-rate regulation and organizational structure.
In 1973, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States20 7 finally made the
antitrust laws applicable to the electric utility industry. In that case,
two cities decided not to renew the franchise of the Otter Tail Power
Company, a vertically integrated, investor-owned utility. Instead, the
cities decided to distribute power to themselves from another source.
Otter Tail refused to either sell power wholesale or to wheel power to
the two cities. The Supreme Court ruled that such use by an integrated
utility of its transmission monopoly to destroy a municipal competitor
was in violation of the Sherman Act. The Court, however, did not ex201. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1982).
202. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 385-95 (1973).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1982).
204. Id § 2135(c)(1).
205. Weiss, supra note 94, at 164.
206. By April of 1978, 26 commitments were made to offer municipal utilities an ownership
interest in a nuclear plant, 28 commitments were made to wheel power for electric systems and 27
commitments were made to share reserves with other systems. Essay, supra note 101, at 1532.
207. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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pressly give the FPC authority to compel wheeling in the event anti-

competitive practices are found. Consequently, the decision did not
strengthen the FPC's position vis-a-vis antitrust enforcement. 20
Municipal utilities unable to obtain transmission services from a
competitor have argued that FERC should be required to enforce the

antitrust laws against utilities that refuse to coordinate in order to injure a competitor. The Supreme Court has ruled that the FPC must
weigh the competitive effects in determining whether a utility's transac-

tion should be approved as being in the public interest. 20 9 Even with
this authorization, the FPC was reluctant to aggressively push forward

interconnections.
In 1978 Congress passed PURPA which contains a weak version
of the common carrier scheme it rejected in 1935. FERC is now au-

thorized, upon the application of an electric utility, to order any other
utility to provide transmission services to the applicant.2 10 The Act also

exempts electric utilities from any state law that prohibits the voluntary
coordination of electricity.2 ' In principle, compulsory wheeling would
greatly enhance coordination efficiency and promote competition at
both the generation and distribution levels of the industry. The Act,
however, places severe restrictions on the availability of wheeling. The

Commission may not issue a wheeling order that will disturb "existing
'
competitive relationships."212
Furthermore, an electric utility may not
be compelled to wheel electricity that would replace power currently
provided to the applicant by the transmission line owner.2 1 3 In effect,
208. FERC has no authority to enforce the antitrust laws. Florida Power & Light Co., 32 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 313, 326 (FERC 1980). But the Court did give such authority to the federal
courts. Id at 375-77. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
209. Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 759-60 (1973). The court focused on the
language of the Federal Power Act stating that "[n]othing in the Act suggests that the 'public
interest' standard of § 204 ... is to be restricted to financial considerations. . . ." Id at 759.
210. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (1982).
211. Id § 824a-l(a).
212. Id § 824j(c)(1).
A recent FERC opinion held that the preservation of existing competitive relationships is a
threshold requirement, therefore, a utility cannot be compelled to wheel under PURPA if such
wheeling would cause the utility to lose wholesale or retail customers within its service area to
other power suppliers. Southeastern Power Admin. v. Ky. Util. Co., 25 FERC 61,204 (1983)
(opinion number 198). The opinion noted that the legislative history of PURPA indicated that the

Act was designed to be competitively neutral and does not provide the Commission with a means
for remedying anticompetitive conduct. Contra New York State Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FERC, 638
F.2d 388, 402 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821 (1981). Under PURPA, an electric utility may be
ordered to wheel power and energy under very limited circumstances, notably, to alleviate the
impact of an oil shortage by increasing the availability of coal-fired generation or to alleviate the
impact of excess capacity by increasing coordination services among utilities.
213. Id § 824j(c)(2)(B).
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the Act denies transmission services to a distribution level competitor
and ultimately forecloses the development of a competitive wholesale
market.
Since the enactment of PURPA, FERC has taken a slightly more
active role, but the federal courts have refused to uphold its decisions.
In New York State Electric and Gas Corp. v. FERC,2 14 the Commission
ordered the deletion from a wheeling contract of a provision prohibiting a municipal utility from selling wheeled power outside its city limits. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the order
would result in more power being wheeled than agreed upon and therefore exceeded the Commission's authority.2"' The dissent argued that
the territorial provision removed by the Commission served to alter
only the use and not the amount of power.21 6 In any event, the additional power claimed only amounted to a supply sufficient to service
twenty-seven residential dwellings.
In another recent case, FloridaPower and Light v. FERC,2 7 the
Commission ordered F.P.&L. to file a single tariff to substitute for
eighteen separate transmission service schedules all providing for an
identical rate. To be included in the tariff was a policy statement to the
effect that transmission services would be provided by F.P.&L. if the
specific potential seller and buyer were contractually identified; the
magnitude, time and duration of the transmission were specified prior
to commencement; it could be determined that the transmission capacity would be available for the term of the contract; and the rate for such
service was sufficient to compensate F.P.&L. for its costs. 21 8 The court
ruled that this statement in effect made F.P.&L. a common carrier and
therefore, under PURPA, the Commission was without authority to
compel wheeling. The court refused to determine whether the Commission had authority to compel wheeling upon a showing of antitrust
violations by a utility. 21 9 The Supreme Court has ruled that federal
214.
215.
216.
217.

638 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1980).

Id at 400-01.
Id at 403 (Goettel, J., dissenting).
660 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981).

218. Id at 671.
219. Id at 676 (footnote omitted).
For a thoughtful and thorough discussion of Florida Power & Light Co. and New York State
Elec. & Gas Corp., see Reiter, Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract
CarrierRegulation Under the FederalPower andNatural Gas Acts, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1

(1983). In a recent and perhaps ground-breaking case, a United States District Court granted a
preliminary injunction ordering mandatory wheeling where an electric utility refused to wheel
power for certain municipal customers unless they entered into new and more costly interconnec-
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courts do have such authority.2 2 0 The Fifth Circuit made clear that any
attempt to foster competition in the wholesale or retail power markets
is not sufficient to compel wheeling or even require inclusion of the
policy statement in future tariffs.
V.
A.

FINDING A PLACE FOR COMPETITION

Recent Proposals

In the wake of recent criticism of rate regulation, various proposals
have been offered for deregulating the electric utility industry. 22' One

proposal would greatly restructure the present organizational framework.222 This proposal calls for the enactment of legislation that would
divide the nation into regional dispatching corporations (RDCs) for

purposes of electric-power production. Each RDC would be privately
owned and would acquire all of the high-voltage transmission capacity
within its region. Each would lease generating plants from low bidding
producers and dispatch electricity in a fully coordinated manner to intion agreements. City of Chanute v. Kan. Gas & Elec. Co., 564 F. Supp. 1416 (D. Kan. 1983),
appealdocketed, No. 83-1818 (10th Cir. June 24, 1983). The injunction was ordered even though
wheeling would alter the status quo and grant the municipals a substantial portion of the relief
they would seek at trial.
220. See Otter TailPower Co., 410 U.S. at 374-75.
221. For a partial list of writings advocating deregulation, see Dowd & Burton, DeregulationIs
Not an Answerfor Electric Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 16, 1982, at 21, 27 n.l; and Address
by David Hughes, Commissioner Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Is There Life After
Deregulation," Before the Institute of Regulation Rate Design Problems of Regulated Industries
(Feb. 8, 1982) (copy on file at TULSA LAW JOURNAL office) (review of possible deregulation scenarios). Richard Gordon advocates complete deregulation of the industry as it is presently structured to preserve integration economies, coordination (planning and building savings), costs of
restructuring the industry and possible extension of regulated service to a partially deregulated
generation. R. GoRDoN, supra note 72, at 276. Professor Trebing criticizes such proposals for
characterizing regulated firms as either essentially competitive or as natural monopolies. Trebing
believes blanket deregulation proposals fail to recognize the highly interdependent and oligopolistic nature of the industry.
In the electric power industry, deregulation would facilitate monopoly control of transmission networks and grids. Control of these facilities would foreclose entry by potential
rivals into both new and established markets, and it would deny wholesale and industrial
buyers access to lower cost sources of power. This could be accomplished by restructuring or conditioning admission to the power pools that manage transmission networks or
by direct acquisition of transmission networks or by direct acquisition of transmission
facilities through holding companies, joint ventures, and so forth. Deregulation would
also encourage intercompany programs for the construction of giant 800-1200 Mw generating plants which could limit the options for innovation while promoting a community
of interest among established firms.
Trebing, supra note 83, at 120. In addition, complete deregulation would be conducive to tight
pooling arrangements and joint ventures to construct power generating facilities. Id at 120 n.l.
Proposals that call for vertically dismembering the industry in conjunction with deregulating the
generation stage would obviate most of the forementioned problems.
222. Essay, supra note 101, at 1538-42.
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dependent distributors. Utilities would continue to possess their own
generating plants and distribution systems. 2 3 The RDCs would be
subject to regulation but, to offset any Averich and Johnson effect, they
would not be permitted to include leased generating plants in their rate
bases. Distribution companies would purchase their full requirements
from the RDCs at a price just covering their pro rata share of the capital and operating expenses of the RDC. To raise capital for the
purchase of transmission facilities, the RDC could presumably issue
low risk securities. The size of the RDCs would be determined by a
cost-benefit analysis comparing transmission costs against coordinating
benefits.22 4 FERC would have exclusive jurisdiction over RDCs.
Another recent proposal to restructure the electric power industry
and introduce competition has been offered by a utility manager.2 2 5
Under this proposal, the present vertically integrated electric monopolies would be replaced by a dozen electric regions where separate generating and distributing companies would be linked together by
regional energy brokers. The energy brokers would make the marketplace for transactions between generating and transmission companies.
The generating companies would be free of regulation while the distribution companies would remain regulated. 22 6 Capacity would be sold
to the distribution companies in the region at an auction through the
regional energy broker. Bid and asked prices would be known and the
market would be monitored to avoid collusion between buyers and sellers. Most capacity would be sold through long term contracts which
could be traded in a secondary market. There would also be spot and
short-term markets with forward transactions and possibly a futures
market. Contracts would provide for a direct pass-through to the distribution company of all fuel and maintenance costs and penalties or
bonuses for unit performance falling below or exceeding the contrac227
tual standards.
Similarly, the broker would pay actual fuel costs incurred by generating companies out of receipts collected from distribution companies. Distribution companies would have the option of buying
sufficient capacity on long or short term contracts. If they exercised
their option, their position would be equivalent to an integrated com223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id at 1538-39.
Id at 1540-41.
Berry, supra note 7.
Id

Id
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pany with adequate capacity reserves. If they chose not to obtain all
the reserves that they anticipated would be necessary, they could still
meet all or part of their reserve requirements in the daily spot market.228 The energy broker would be a party to all contracts to establish
transmission costs and also would control the use of the region's available capacity to meet energy demand, holding at any given time a collection of long and short term contracts entitling each distribution
company to a certain amount of capacity. The energy broker would be
responsible for employing the total capacity available to meet energy
needs as efficiently as possible through economic dispatch without regard to the distribution company's needs for specific capacity.22 9
Each distribution company would be entitled only to its contracted-for energy. If a company's needs were greater, it would have to
resort to the spot market. The profits achieved from the efficient dispatch of the region would accrue to the distribution companies and
would be based on the amount utilized by each generating unit, thereby
increasing revenues to distributors holding contracts for low fuel cost
units. Reserves kept on hand by the generating companies for reliability purposes would be charged pro rata to the distribution companies.
Distribution companies in each region would form a regional association to monitor the performance of the broker, assure fairness, and exchange information about future load requirements.230
These proposals have many advantages. They would eliminate
the monopolistic behavior characteristic of power pools and require
fewer managerial decisions. Under the RDC plan, producers would
have to compete for contracts to lease generating capacity. Under the
energy broker plan, distributors would bid for producer contracts.
Both plans are similar to the Demsetz approach 231 except that under
the RDC plan, profits from efficiency accrue to consumers, while under
the energy broker plan, efficiency savings accrue to distributors. In
either case, distributors would be able to secure low cost bulk-power on
an equal footing and thus be in a better position to compete with one
another. The proposals would also presumably eliminate conflicting
regulatory rules. FERC would retain sole jurisdiction over RDCs
while the energy brokers would be overseen by a central distributor
committee. Finally, under competitive conditions, new capacity would
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id
Id
Id
See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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be offered so that firms could achieve earnings adequate to pay the
market cost of capital or ensure bondholders of the safety of their
investment.
It is unclear, however, whether FERC could do a better job of
regulating than the state commissions are presently doing. It is also
unclear as to how the energy brokers would be overseen. A large supervisory committee composed of distributors may either bottle-neck in
conflicting viewpoints, or because of a free rider problem,232 impede
efficiency.
B. An Alternative Proposal

Arguably, the proposals discussed above probably do too much
too soon and are not likely to carry enough legislative support. Congress might be more receptive to competitive presumptive legislation as
an initial starting place in increasing efficiency within the industry.
Several options that employ either the carrot or the stick are available
to induce the industry to begin restructuring itself into a more efficient
and competitive market.
The stick could take the form of a general requirement of interconnection and wheeling at reasonable rates; the elimination of private
and public territorial restrictions at the wholesale and retail levels; and
increased antitrust enforcement against horizonal and vertical mergers,
as well as combination utilities. This proposal falls short of requiring
the dissolution of existing utilities or the condemnation of transmission
facilities.
The carrot could take the form of rate regulation based on a differential level of profits. A differential level of profits could be related to a
utility's market and its degree of competitiveness. The more competitive the market, the greater the relaxation of the level of profits associated with serving that market.233 This would create a positive
232. A free rider problem will arise when one or more committee members believe that benefits will accrue to their constituencies regardless of any individual concessions they may make.
Each committee member has an incentive not to make any contributions, believing that other
members will bear the cost of the public good.
233. Trebling, supra note 43, at 108. State commissions are already rewarding or penalizing
electric utilities on the basis of their managerial actions. See, e.g., Southwestern Public Service
Co., 27 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 302, 313 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1979) (Commission allowed
.5% increase in rate of return as reward for efficient and prudent management), Detroit Edison
Co., 47 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 292 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) (Commission allowed an
increase in rate of return to encourage efficient management of generating facilities), Carolina
Power & Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 188, 249 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1982) (Commis-

sion reduced return on common equity by I per cent as penalty for inefficient and imprudent
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inducement for a firm to act in a competitive manner since the potential loss of the firm's market to a rival would always exist. Determining
the competiveness of a market and an associated profit level might be
problematic, but even an imprecise scheme would be sure to induce
different strategies on the part of utilities.
C. ProbableEffects of Increased Competition
It has been argued that increased competition would benefit municipal utilities at the expense of private utilities because municipal
companies enjoy a tax-exempt status, a lower cost of capital, and preferential access to low cost federal power projects. 2 34 The argument is
that municipals would be given an artificial advantage in the retail
market, thus promoting increased public ownership of existing distribution systems. In effect, municipals would "skim the cream"2 35 off the
market, leaving only the high cost customers for private utilities to
serve. To a lesser extent, public expansion into the wholesale bulkpower market would increase because of tax and cost-of-capital advantages.236 Such contentions, however, are not well founded. Municipals
have already inefficiently expanded into the wholesale bulk-power
market as a result of being denied access to low cost power. Once
smaller companies could obtain low cost bulk-power, the need to build
their own generators would vanish.
At the retail level, some expansion of municipal utilities may occur. But the cost advantages of municipal utilities are often overestimated. Many municipals provide free services such as street lighting.
Further, many municipals generate revenues in excess of cost in order
to contribute to local governments. In 1973, local governments received in excess of 134 million dollars in revenue contributions to their
general fund from publicly-owned electric utilities.2 37 Interestingly,
those municipals that had to contribute revenues to general funds operated more efficiently (at a lower cost) than those who did not. Arguamanagement), Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 157, 216-17 (Tex.

Pub. Util. Comm'n 1983) (Commission reduced return on common equity by .5% as penalty for
mismanagement). One commission has even threatened to base an electric utilities' rate of return
on the success or lack of success of the utilities aggressiveness in soliciting and bringing on line cogenerators and/or small power producers. Idaho Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 160,
164-65 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982).
234. Pace & Landon, supra note 14.
235. For a thorough review of this concept, see 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 220.46.
236. See EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 25.
237. Nelson, Revenue Contributionsand Efficiency in Municipal Utilities, 18 ECON. INQUIRY

509 (1980).
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bly, once municipals obtain cheaper power they will not fully reduce
rates, but rather transfer some profits to their general funds. Nevertheless, some municipal expansion would be beneficial by encouraging
vertical disintegration in the industry. In graduated steps, as competition increases, subsidies to publicly-owned utilities should be eliminated to foster competition and efficiency.
The cream-skimming argument is generally cast in terms of a new
competitive entrant choosing to serve only the most lucrative markets,
leaving the less attractive markets to the established utility. 38 The retail-industrial and wholesale electric power markets are most susceptible to a revenue diversion of this kind. Generally a new firm will enter
one of these markets either because it enjoys lower costs than the incumbent, it provides a service not provided by the incumbent, or the
incumbent is engaging in cross-subsidization between different markets
and cannot foreclose entry into all its markets. The first two cases illustrate conditions where an entrant should cream-skim as a matter of
policy. In the case of a municipal cream-skimmer, vertical disintegration would again be encouraged. The remaining inelastic demand customers of the pre-existing utility, however, would have increased rates.
The cross-subsidization case is more problematic. Cross-subsidization
would likely take place upon the introduction of selective competitive
pressures. That is, a utility would raise rates in monopolistic markets
while reducing rates in competitive markets. This practice has raised
many pricing and cost allocation problems in the communications industry, since price can be employed as part of a strategy to shape markets.2 39 In the electric utility industry, however, a larger part of the
total revenue would be subject to potential competition than in the case
of common carrier communications. For example, forty-one percent of
the sales of private utilities are made in competitive retail-industrial
markets while thirty-one percent of the sales are made in the more monopolistic residential markets. 240 To the extent workable competition
could develop in the wholesale market, residential markets would be
more competitive. Since costs are assigned to specific customer classes
identified in public hearings, political pressure would act to discourage
cross-subsidizing.
An additional argument is that competition in the electric utility
238. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 12, at 225-26 for a review of possible definitions of cream-

skimming.
239. For a discussion of the problem in the communications area, see id at 227-33.
240. Trebing, supra note 43, at 105.
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industry is not viable as long as the price of electricity is based on average costs rather than marginal costs. This argument is undoubtedly
correct. The objective of competition is to shift business from inefficient to efficient suppliers. Selection of power suppliers on the basis of
their average cost of production will bear no necessary relationship to
the suppliers' efficiency in furnishing additional power. Congress recognized the need for a more efficient pricing mechanism when it enacted PURPA. If marginal cost pricing or peak load pricing is not
universally adopted, it may be necessary for Congress to pre-empt state
legislation. Marginal cost pricing is feasible. Marginal costs of power
transactions can now be estimated with accuracy.2 41 However, under
present conditions, marginal costs exceed average costs so the price of
electricity would probably be higher in a competitive environment although residential customers would be the beneficiaries of reduced
rates relative to industrial customers. u42 As pressures for efficiency increase, rates would probably come down. In any event, under the present regulatory scheme, prices are escalating with no foreseeable end.
Recently, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has shown
an increased awareness of the need for competition and coordination in
the electric utility industry. On June 8, 1983, Commissioner David
Hughes unveiled a FERC experimeit in competitive bulk-power electricity sales. Under the plan, eight publicly and privately owned utilities in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona will open up their transmission
grids to each other and furnish each other with market information.
The expirement is on a voluntary basis and for a limited time period.
In exchange for their cooperation in the experiment, FERC will grant
the utilities more pricing flexibility and will allow the firms to keep a
share of profits from their sales. FERC will also allow buying utilities
to pass through all purchase costs.
The plan does not involve a common carrier obligation since
transmission services will be available for a limited time period and
available only to participants making certain coordinated sales. Commissioner Hughes stated that this action "could very well be the most
important decision made by our Commission during this decade" 243
241. Pace & Landon, supra note 14, at 43.
242. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
243. Speech by Commissioner David Hughes, before The New York Society of Security Analysts (June 8, 1983) (copy on file at TULSA LAW JOURNAL office). See also FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, INSIDE F.E.R.C., June 20, 1983, at 8 and FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, INSIDE F.E.R.C., June 13, 1983, at 1-2. The bulk-power experiment has also
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given the experiment's potential impact on regulatory policy and industry operation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the present regulatory scheme has produced distortions affecting both the electric utility industry and its customers.
The past justification for this regulatory scheme may no longer be valid
in light of recent empirical evidence and experience. Congress must
take affirmative steps to require interconnection and wheeling, eliminate territorial restrictions and empower FERC with antitrust remedies
to induce vertical disintegration of the industry. Additionally, rate regulation based on a differential level of profits and marginal cost pricing
should be required to induce competition. If efficiency and reliability
are goals to be achieved, then competition must be relied upon in the
years ahead to solve the problems confronting the electric utility
industry.
been endorsed by the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations. H.R. REP. No.
217 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 130-31 (1983).
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